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Pre-Trial Criminal Commitment to Mental Institutions:
The Procedure in Massachusetts and Suggested Reforms

STEVEN L. ENGELBERG*

Mental unsoundness in a person accused of crime may give rise to
two entirely distinct legal problems. The first is the question of the
defendant's responsibility: whether, at the time of the act charged,
he was so mentally disordered as not to be punishable for it, under
the legal test of responsibility ....
The other involves the defendant's mental condition not at the time of the act charged, but at the
time of the criminal proceeding-whether he is presently sane
enough to plead or be tried ....
Since the first problem involves
the "guilt" or "innocence" of the defendant, while the second does
not, the latter has been given comparatively little consideration.
Nevertheless, as a matter of procedure, it is highly important."
I. Introduction
In Massachusetts, the crime of assault with intent to murder carries a ten
year maximum sentence.' Yet, a man spent over 43 years of his life at the
Bridgewater State Hospital because he was charged with such a crime. This
individual was 26 years old when admitted to the hospital on March 30, 1915,
and he died there on October 26, 1958. His diagnosis was schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type. He never left Bridgewater, and he was never tried for
the crime of assault with intent to murder. Although under the law of Massachusetts he was presumed to be innocent of the charge and although he was
never convicted, the charge itself served as a sufficient basis for the state to

* E. Barrett Prettyman Fellow, Legal Intern Program, Georgetown University Law Center;
B.A., University of Michigan, 1963; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1966; Member of D.C. Bar.
This article is based on a paper which, in 1967, was awarded first prize in a competition
on problems in the administration of criminal justice sponsored by the Institute on American Freedoms.
80H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DisoRDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENsE 428 (1954).
1. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 15 (1959).
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detain him for the greatest part of his life. An even more startling case was
that involving a 24 year old man admitted to Bridgewater on March 17,1896,
on the basis of being charged with the crime of vagrancy. His diagnosis was
schizophrenic reaction, hebephrenic. This man was detained at Bridgewater
until his death on September 23, 1959, without ever being tried for the minor
criminal charge which brought him there. 2
These two cases are not isolated occurrences. According to a 1961 study
which focused on the population at Bridgewater, of the 197 patients listed as
indefinite pre-trial commitments since 1896, only two persons had ever been
released.8
Why are these individuals committed? In theory, such commitments are
the result of a long established rule at common law that an accused could not
be required to plead to an indictment or be tried for a crime when he was so
mentally disordered that he could not make a rational defense. 4 One reason
often given in support of this rule is that it prevents trial of a defendant who,
though physically present, is mentally absent during much of the trial. 5 This
reason is based on a "leading principle that pervades the entire law of criminal procedure . . .that, after indictment . . . nothing shall be done in the

absence of the prisoner." More basically, this "universally accepted rule
prohibiting the trial of a mentally incompetent defendant" is derived from
the realization that "the judicial process would be denigrated by the spectacle
of a prosecution of a severely disoriented person," and that "the reliability
of a conviction is reduced if individuals incapable of self-defense are forced
to stand trial." 7 This idea has been expressed in various cases as follows:
It would be inhumane, and to a certain extent a denial of the right
of trial upon the merits, to require one who has been disabled by
the act of God from intelligently making his defense to plead or be
tried for his life or liberty. There may be circumstances in all cases
of which the defendant alone has knowledge, which would prove
his innocence, the advantage of which, if insane to such an extent
that he did not appreciate the value of such facts, or the propriety
of communicating them to his counsel, he would be deprived.8
The common law standard for determining competency to stand trial grew
out of the basic principle that an individual must be capable of "playing the
2. D. Bright, Pre-Trial Commitment in Massachusetts 30, June 1, 1961 (unpublished
thesis in Boston University Law-Medicine Institute Library).
3.Id. at 44. In addition to Bridgewater, which is under the authority of the Commissioner of Corrections, such pre-trial commitments are also made to twelve state hospitals
of the Department of Mental Health throughout the state.

4. Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899).

5. People v. Berling, 115 Cal. App. 2d 255, 251 P.2d 1017 (1953).

6. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892).
7. Krash, The Durham Rule and judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the
District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 908 (1961).
8. Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 87, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (1911).
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role" of a criminal defendant in order to participate in any criminal proceedings against him. According to this standard, a criminal defendant is
ready to participate in criminal proceedings only if he "is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against him; if
he rightly comprehends his own condition with reference to such proceedings, and can conduct his defense in a rational manner....0 This standard, unlike the test for determining criminal responsibility, is uniformly
accepted in almost every jurisdiction with only slight variations. 10
It is held to be a violation of due process of law "to subject an insane person
to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or life,"" and the trial or conviction of an incompetent defendant is held absolutely void.' 2 The basic
problem, then, concerns the proper disposition of a criminal defendant who
is found to be incompetent to stand trial. At common law, the practice seems
to have been to confine such an individual to jail.' 3 It has even been held
that in the absence of a statute the judge had the power only to order the
incompetent defendant confined in jail. 14 Such statutes, however, are common. Professor Weihofen reports that in all but a few states the subject of
mental incompetency at the time of criminal proceedings is now covered by
statute, and that almost all of these statutes provide that if the defendant is
found to be incompetent, he shall be confined to a hospital or a mental in9. State v. Severns, 184 Kan. 213, 219, 336 P.2d 447, 452 (1959).
10. In all but a few states, the subject of a defendant's competency to stand trial is covered
by statute. H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DxsoRER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 435 (1954). As two commentators who surveyed the statutory formulation of this standard observed, none of the
statutes establishes a rigid test, such as that used in determining criminal responsibility:
Thus, in thirty-four jurisdictions "insanity" figures among the grounds for postponement of the proceedings: in some of these jurisdictions the state of mind must be one
of "insanity" before postponement of the proceedings is allowed, while in the rest of
these jurisdictions "insanity" is one of two or more alternative mental conditions justifying such a postponement. Other terms commonly used are "idiot," "lunatic" ..."unsound mind" ..."mentally disordered"... and so forth. ...Seventeen states embody the
term "mentally defective" or its equivalent in the statutory definition. In thirteen states
and the District of Columbia the test "incapable of assisting in his defense" or its equivalent is applied.
F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 359 (1961).
However, regardless of the varying statutory formulations of the test of competency to
stand trial, almost every jurisdiction has "retained the common law criteria of ability to
comprehend the proceedings and assist in the defense." Ibid. See also Annot., 3 A.L.R. 94
(1919). This is true of the statute adopted by Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964). One notable
exception is the Pennsylvania statute which states that a person should not be tried for a
crime if his mental illness is severe enough to make it necessary or advisable for him to be
under care. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1222 (1954).
11. Youtsey v. United States, supra note 4, at 941; United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F.
Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
12. Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1945).
13. Commonwealth v. Hathaway, 13 Mass. 299 (1816); Commonwealth v. Braley, 1 Mass.
103 (1804).
14. Hawie v. Hawie, 128 Miss. 473, 91 So. 131 (1922).
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stitution. 15 In Greenwood v. United States,16 the Supreme Court sanctioned
the authority of the federal government to commit incompetent defendants
to a mental institution prior to trial as incident to the power to prosecute
crime, an "incontestable national power." The result of such pre-trial confinement is that criminal proceedings are postponed until the accused is considered competent to stand trial.
Whether or not the assumption that commitment to a mental institution
will enable most defendants to regain their competency is a correct one, it is
clear that such an assumption underlies the state and federal statutes which
provide for pre-trial criminal commitment. Inherent in the suspension of
criminal proceedings and the subsequent commitment to a mental institution
is the judgment that this type of institutionalization will improve the defendant's mental condition to the point where he is competent to face the
charges against him. Thus, from the point of view of the policy underlying
the commitment procedure, it follows that the justification for such commitments is that the defendant may sufficiently respond to institutional treatment so that he can be returned to court.
In Massachusetts, however, the justification for pre-trial criminal commitments has not been clarified. Obviously, when an individual charged with the
crime of vagrancy is committed to a mental institution for the remainder of
his life, the purpose of such commitment is not to enable the defendant to
return to court and face the charge against him. In the past several years,
some courts and psychiatrists in Massachusetts have shown a growing awareness of the problem of indefinite pre-trial commitment and have attempted
to formulate a proper justification for a practice which has existed for many
years. Nevertheless, there still exists a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding as to what constitutes the proper purpose of these commitments.
This is primarily a result of inadequacy in the statute regulating the procedure for pre-trial commitment and the dearth of case law on the subject.
It is this procedure of pre-trial criminal commitment in Massachusetts
which will serve as the focal point of this article, the aims of which are basically two-fold.' 7 The first is to analyze the procedure whereby a criminal defendant is committed in Massachusetts and to determine the consequences
of such commitment for the individual involved. It will be necessary to de15. H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 10, at 435, 438. In those states which do not require hospitalization, it is discretionary, but in at least five states, hospitalization "is ordered if the
court believes that the release of the accused would be 'dangerous' or a 'menace.'" F.
LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, supra note 10, at 361.

16. 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956).
17. "[I]ncompetency as a ground for postponing criminal proceedings may be raised at
any stage from arraignment to execution of sentence. The issue is usually raised before the
trial and most statutes deal mainly with the capacity to stand trial." F. LINDMAN & D.
MCINTYRE, supra note 10, at 360. Therefore, it is the finding of incompetency prior -totrial and
the commitment that occurs at that time with which this study is concerned.
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cipher the standard upon which such commitments are based. ("Decipher"
is used advisedly, for as it will appear, there is a current debate within Massachusetts as to just what is the proper standard.)
In explaining the Massachusetts system of pre-trial commitment, the objections to this system will be surveyed. In addition, there are several constitutional problems which arise because of the constant use of this pre-trial
commitment process for purposes other than to enable a mentally incompetent defendant to return to court. These constitutional problems must at
least be presented and explored; they cannot simply be ignored as is the
tendency of most of the cases dealing with this subject.
The second aim of this article is to recommend needed reforms in the
present procedure of pre-trial criminal commitment in Massachusetts. These
suggestions should flow from the analysis in the first section of this procedure
and the problems which it has created. Basically, an attempt will be made to
clarify the proper standard for competency to stand trial, to establish a procedure for the determination of a defendant's competency and the disposition of those defendants who are considered incompetent, and to specify
the role of the court, the psychiatrist, and the defendant and his lawyer in
this procedure.
It should be noted that the basic concern in this study is with the deprivation of liberty of an individual criminal defendant who has not been
convicted of any crime. Theoretically, the state's interest in achieving criminal justice could also be endangered by a defendant who feigns mental incompetency to avoid standing trial. Where the crime charged is very serious,
the possibility of such malingering would seem to be enhanced. But based
on the writer's study of the practice in one state, this theoretical possibility
does not exist in practice.' 8 Rather, the defendant who is indefinitely committed to a mental institution prior to trial either is indifferent to his fate or
opposes it; very rarely is the problem presented where a defendant claims he
is incompetent to stand trial, and the state suspects him of attempting to
avoid standing trial. As a practical matter, therefore, the process of pre-trial
criminal commitment inevitably raises the problem of attempting to prevent
an unwarranted and unjustified pre-trial detention in a mental institution.
There is no reason to assume that this basic problem does not exist in
many other jurisdictions. Based on this study of the operation of the pretrial commitment procedures in Massachusetts, it seems evident that the
problem is a pervasive one. As previously mentioned, this article focuses on
Massachusetts simply because it was possible for the writer to interview some
18. "[M]alingering to avoid trial rarely occurs except in homicide cases where the penalty is death. In fact, a moderate prison term with the possibility of early parole is usually
preferred when the alternative is indefinite commitment to a mental hospital with the prospect of trial on release." Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial,21 U. Prrr. L. REv.
593, 601 (1960).
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of the judges, district attorneys, psychiatrists, and other officials who play an
important role in this system of pre-trial criminal commitment.' 9 However,
since the statutory scheme in almost every jurisdiction is similar to that in
Massachusetts, it is likely that the confusion and misunderstanding which has
existed there exists elsewhere. Indeed, many of the cases discussed herein
illustrate that abuses of the pre-trial commitment procedure do arise in other
jurisdictions. Since it is unwarranted to suppose that Massachusetts is unique
in its handling of the problem of pre-trial criminal commitments, it is hoped
that the discussion and observations to follow will, in general, apply to the
practices of other jurisdictions. Even though the recommendations contained
in the third part of this article will be aimed at reforming the procedure of
pre-trial commitment in one state, it is believed that they will be relevant to
the general problem throughout the United States.
I. The MassachusettsSystem of Pre-Trial Commitment: The Procedure
and the Problems
If it be argued that the court, in employing the concept of competency for purposes other than those inherent in the common law
tradition and statute and in relinquishing their interest in the defendant after his commitment, are attempting to reach toward some
more humane goal than imprisonment, it can be pointed out that
such humane goals are not reached in terms of the aftermath of incompetency proceedings. To put the matter bluntly, in many cases
19. The following is a list of the individuals interviewed by the writer:
Honorable Reuben L. Lurie, Superior Court Judge of Massachusetts, in Brookline,
Massachusetts, Jan. 27, 1966.
Honorable Julien L. Yesley, District Court of Newton, Massachusetts, in Newton,
Massachusetts, Dec. 13, 1965.
Honorable Paul K. Connolly, 2d District Court of Eastern Middlesex County, in
Waltham, Massachusetts, Dec. 22, 1965.
Dr. A. Louis McGarry, Law-Medicine Institute, Boston University, in Boston, Massachusetts, Dec. 3, 1965 and Dec. 10, 1965.
Dr. Ames Robey, Medical Director of Bridgewater State Hospital, in Bridgewater,
Massachusetts, Dec. 16, 1965.
Dr. Alan Rothstein, Senior Psychiatrist on the Female Reception Service, Boston State
Hospital, in Boston, Massachusetts, Dec. 20, 1965.
Howard Colpitts, Criminal Court Clerk, 1st Session, Middlesex County, in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Feb. 4, 1966.
John Fleeming, Probation Officer, Middlesex County, in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Feb. 4, 1966.
Walter Lawler, Chief Probation Officer, Middlesex County, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Feb. 4, 1966.
In addition to interviews, the writer worked as an intern at the Middlesex County District
Attorney's Office during 1965-66; during this period, the writer benefited from informative
discussions with several assistant district attorneys concerning the Massachusetts pre-trial
commitment procedure. The interviews and discussions served as the basis of the writer's
understanding of this procedure, and most of the observations and criticisms in the study are
a result of these interviews and discussions; specific interviews are referred to only where it is
thought to be necessary to do so.
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a prison sentence would be preferable to the presumably more compassionate act of committing an individual as incompetent. 20
The Statutory Framework
The authority for pre-trial criminal commitment in Massachusetts is found
in two sections of the Massachusetts General Laws. Chapter 123, Section 100
provides that:
If a person under complaint or indictment for any crime ...is at
the time appointed for trial, hearing or sentence, or at any time
prior thereto found by the court to be mentally ill or in such mental
condition that his commitment to a state hospital is necessary for
his proper care or observation pending a determination as to any
mental illness, the court may commit him to a state hospital .. .
under such limitations, subject to the provisions of section one hundred and five, as it may order. The court may in its discretion employ
one or more experts in mental illness . . . to examine the person
21

Section 105 provides in part that "a prisoner committed.
to a state hospital under section one hundred. . . for his proper care or observation pending the determination of his insanity shall, unless found to be insane as hereinafter provided, be returned" to court within 35 days after his commitment
under Section 100.22 Section 105 also provides for the return to court of a
person committed as insane under Section 100 who has not been "restored
to sanity." He is returned "because in the opinion of the superintendent ....
neither the public interest nor the welfare of the prisoner will be promoted
by his further retention in the hospital," and the hospital must submit "a
report relative to the prisoner's mental condition as affecting his criminal
responsibility and the advisability of his discharge or temporary release from
the. . . custody to which he is returned." 23 The most crucial part of Section
105 is that providing for indefinite pre-trial commitment:
If a prisoner, committed ...under section one hundred.. . for
his proper care or observation as aforesaid, is found by the superintendent . . . to be insane, the finding shall be certified upon the
warrant or commitment, and the superintendent of the institution
, *shall report the prisoner's mental condition to the court or judge
issuing the warrant or commitment. . . with the recommendation
that the prisoner be committed as an insane person. The court ...
may thereupon commit the prisoner to an institution for the insane,
if, in the opinion of the court . . . such commitment is necessary.
-

20. Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Procedures, Results, and Problems,
119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 713, 716 (1963).
21. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 100 (1958).
22. Id. § 105.
23. Ibid.
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The provisions of this section relative to the return to custody. . . of
a prisoner taken therefrom under section one hundred . . . shall
24
apply, so far as apt, to a prisoner committed under this section.
And finally, Section 105 provides:
When, in the opinion of the superintendent of the state hospital to
which a prisoner has been committed.., under section one hundred
... the mental condition of the prisoner is such that he should be
returned to custody. . . he. . . shall so certify upon the warrant or
commitment, and notice, accompanied by a written statement regarding the mental condition of the prisoner, shall be given to the
proper custodian. . . who shall thereupon cause the prisoner to be
25
reconveyed . . . [to court].
These sections were first enacted in 1849, but even prior to that time, the
Massachusetts courts recognized the common law principle that one could
not be required to plead or be tried while he was insane. In Commonwealth
v. Braley26 and Commonwealth v. Hathaway,27 the trial courts, based on their
observation of the defendant's appearance and conduct at the time of arraignment, had reason to doubt the defendant's sanity. In each case, the court
impaneled a jury to determine the defendant's sanity, and in each instance,
after the jury determined that the defendant was in fact insane, he was remanded to prison.
The statute significantly changed this common law practice. The psychiatrist has replaced the jury in aiding the court in its determination of the
defendant's mental condition. If the defendant is considered mentally ill,
the court may commit him to a mental institution, but not to prison. According to Professor Weihofen, almost every state specifically authorizes the court
either to appoint one or more impartial psychiatrists to examine the defendant whose mental competency is in issue or to commit the defendant to a
28
state hospital for a period of observation.
There are other methods of determining a defendant's mental condition
which do not require commitment. Section 100 allows the court in its discretion to employ experts in mental illness, apparently to aid the court in its
determination of the defendant's mental condition. In addition, Chapter 123,
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Supra note 13.
27. Supra note 13.
28. H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 10, at 449. It has been reported that in thirty-four jurisdictions, the determination of the defendant's competency to stand trial is expressly required
to be made by the judge; but many of these statutes authorize the court to employ experts
and impanel juries to assist it in reaching a decision. Thus, in five states the court has discretion as to whether a jury should be impaneled, whereas in nineteen states a jury is

mandatory, at least if requested by one of the parties. Use of a panel of experts to determine
this question is provided for in eight jurisdictions. F.
10, at 361.

LINDMAN

& D. MCINTYRE, supra note
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Section 99 provides that "[i]n order to determine the mental condition of any
person coming before any court of the commonwealth, the presiding judge
may, in his discretion, request the department [of mental health] to assign a
member of the medical staff of a state hospital to make such examinations as
he may deem necessary." 29 Finally, the existence of court clinics under the
Department of Mental Health enables a court to screen defendants in order
to determine whether it is necessary to commit them to a mental institution.3 0
Thus, even where a court has some doubt about a criminal defendant's mental condition prior to trial, it can receive an evaluation of his condition without committing the defendant under Sections 100 and 105. At the present
time, however, very few courts take advantage of these alternatives to commitment. Where the court seeks a determination of a defendant's mental
condition, Sections 100 and 105 are most often relied upon.
The Search for a Standard
Sections 100 and 105 refer only to "mental illness" or "insanity," without
attempting to define these terms for the purpose of pre-trial commitment.
Even though in most jurisdictions "insanity" is the standard in determining
whether a defendant should be committed prior to trial, the case law has
made it clear that the criterion is the common law test of competency to
3
stand trial. '
In Massachusetts, however, the vagueness in the statutory formulation has
not been clarified by case law; indeed, the few cases which deal with this problem have only succeeded in muddying the waters. In Commonwealth v.
Devereaux, s2 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the denial of a new trial
based on defendant's post-trial claim that he was insane and therefore not
criminally responsible. This defendant had been examined under the Briggs
Law, and the court concluded that if these examiners had found that defendant was not criminally responsible for the crime because of insanity, he
would never have been brought to trial: "It is a necessary deduction from all
the circumstances that the defendant was put upon trial on the indictment
because the report of the department of mental diseases upheld his criminal
responsibility." 33 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Gray,3 4 the court stated that
the purpose of requiring an examination under the Briggs Law is to prevent
one within the purview of the statute from being "put upon his trial unless
29. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 99 (1958). Section 1OOA of Chapter 123 (known as the
Briggs Law) also provides for a mental examination of certain classes of criminal defendants, without the need of any commitment.
30. Interview with Judge Paul K. Connolly, supra note 19.
31. F. LINDMAN &D. MCINTYRE, supra note 10, at 359.
32. 257 Mass. 391, 153 N.E. 881 (1926).
33. Id. at 396-97, 153 N.E. at 883.
34. 314 Mass. 96, 49 N.E.2d 603 (1943).
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his mental condition is thereby determined to be such as to render him responsible to trial and punishment for the crime charged against him. . . ."35
These cases indicate the view of the Supreme Judicial Court that a criminal defendant should not be brought to trial, and should therefore be indefinitely committed under Sections 100 and 105, if he is suffering from a mental
disease affecting his responsibility for the crime charged against him. There
is no concern in these cases as to whether the defendant is capable of understanding the charges against him and assisting in his defense. This attitude of
the Massachusetts court is best illustrated in Commonwealth v. Cox, s6 where
a defendant was examined prior to trial on a first degree murder charge and
then committed to Bridgewater for observation under Section 100. On the
basis of a report that the defendant was "insane and in need of care in a hospital for mental disease," the defendant was committed indefinitely for almost
two years.37 When the medical director at Bridgewater reported that the defendant had "recovered," he was returned for trial, where a jury found him
guilty. The appellate court found that the defendant was not criminally responsible and that the guilty verdict "was against the weight of the evidence,
and [that] there should be a new trial."3 8 The court, relying on Commonwealth v. Devereaux, realized that the reports of the psychiatrists after the
observation "did not undertake to state that the defendant was not criminally
responsible on the day of the killing. Had they done so, the defendant doubtless would not have been brought to trial."39 (Emphasis added.)
The court in Cox did not examine the basis upon which the defendant
was committed for two years prior to trial and did not consider the propriety
of such a commitment. The defendant had allegedly killed his wife in a brutal manner "to spare her the sufferings of financial adversity" and of growing
old; he confessed immediately to the crime. The court stated that "following
the assaults, the defendant exhibited no remorse, and his outward manner
was calm and composed." Regardless of whether this defendant was criminally responsible, the impression emerges that he was competent to stand trial
under the common law standard. But the court demonstrated that it was not
even aware of the problem in committing the defendant prior to trial for almost two years without any indication that he was incapable of standing trial.
On the contrary, the court assumed that a defendant would not be returned
40
to trial where there were doubts as to his criminal responsibility.
35. Id. at 100, 49 N.E.2d at 607.
36. 327 Mass. 609, 100 N.E.2d 14 (1951).
37. Id. at 612, 100 N.E.2d at 16.
38. Id. at 615, 100 N.E.2d at 17.
39. Id. at 614, 100 N.E.2d at 16.
40. In only one case has the Massachusetts court squarely faced and discussed the issue
of defendant's capacity to stand trial. In Commonwealth v. Harrison, 342 Mass. 279, 173
N.E.2d 87 (1961), the defendant was tried and convicted for the murder of his wife. Defendant argued on appeal that a self-inflicted brain injury, caused by an attempt to shoot him-
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The Supreme Judicial Court thus has confused the test for competency to
stand trial and the test for criminal responsibility, and it has stated that a
defendant could not stand trial if he lacked criminal responsibility. In no
case did the court even comment on the validity of an indefinite pre-trial
commitment. 41 In an effort to fill this void caused by the absence of judicial
guidelines, Dr. Ames Robey, the Medical Director at Bridgewater, has attempted to communicate to the courts, as well as to psychiatrists, a clear
standard of competency to stand trial to be applied under Sections 100 and
105.42 Dr. Robey accepts the common law standard of competency to stand
trial. After dealing with many individuals at Bridgewater, who had been
committed "without reference to their competency to be returned to trial,"
he devised a "checklist" consisting of three basic categories: comprehension
of court proceedings, ability to advise counsel, and susceptibility to decom43
pensation while awaiting or standing trial.
In his radical departure from past practice in Massachusetts, Dr. Robey
states that "even in the presence of mental illness," incompetency does not
automatically follow: "Even though found to be psychotic, if the patient is
self, "blunted [his] emotional awareness of the peril of his position" so "that he knew that
he might be found guilty but did not care." But the court was impressed with the psychiatrist's testimony that the defendant was "correctly oriented in all spheres" and with the fact
that defendant had appeared in court and addressed the jury. The court therefore concluded that:
[I]t was not error to decide that the defendant, notwithstanding his illnesses, weaknesses
and injury, was sufficiently a human being to be brought to trial, with ability, although
impaired, to cooperate in his own defence. "Constitutional or other inferiority is not the
test of criminal responsibility." (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 295, 173 N.E.2d at 97. Even though the court was able to analyze the issue of defendant's
capacity to stand trial, it concluded its analysis by reference to "the test of criminal responsibility." The court thereby indicated its confusion as to exactly what was being determined
in the case.
41. Perhaps the most startling example of a court's failure to comment on the propriety
of a pre-trial commitment occurred in Commonwealth v. Zelenski, 287 Mass. 125, 191 N.E.
355 (1934), a case involving a man indicted for murder who had been committed for ten
years prior to trial. The issue in the case was whether the defendant's confession, which had
been given the day after the crime occurred, was admissible in view of the defendant's mental illness. The court held that it was admissible:
This testimony was not rendered inadmissible by the mental condition of the defen-

dant. The medical evidence falls far short of proving that the mental infirmities of the
defendant deprived him of the faculty of consciousness of the physical acts performed by
him, of the power to retain them in his memory, and of the capacity to make a statement
of those acts with reasonable accuracy. An insane person is not necessarily an incompetent witness. Kendall v. May, 10 Allen 59, 64. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 126-29, 191 N.E. at 357.
It is at least arguable that if a person who is mentally ill is capable of making a reliable
confession, he is capable of standing trial; this does not necessarily follow, but it is a question
which would have warranted the court's consideration. And yet, the court simply accepted
the competency of this defendant to make a reliable confession, which involved the ability
to retain and communicate certain facts, without even recognizing the possible inconsistency
between this finding and the defendant's ten year commitment prior to trial.
42. Interview with Dr. Robey, supra note 19.
45. Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists,122 AM.
J. Psvc.AmTY 616, 617 (1965).
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able to comprehend those aspects of the court procedure listed, and able to
work with his lawyer in conducting a defense, he should go back to trial." 44
According to Dr. Robey, many courts are now willing to accept his report at
the end of an observation commitment that a defendant is "mentally ill but
competent to stand trial." He claims that such acceptance was difficult at
first, for most courts believed that if a defendant was suffering from a mental
illness, he was committable under Sections 100 and 105.
One superior court judge, however, expressed dissatisfaction with a report which stated that defendant was "mentally ill but competent to stand
trial." When he gets such a report, this judge stated that he requests the Department of Mental Health under Sections 99 or 100 to assign a psychiatrist
to examine the defendant and make another report to the court. An assistant district attorney in Middlesex County argues that a finding by the
psychiatrist that a defendant is "mentally ill but competent to stand trial"
increases the expenses of the state, since it forces certain judges to request an additional psychiatric examination from the Department of Mental
Health. This assistant believes that such a report serves no useful function
and confuses the court. A probation officer summed up these objections to the
so-called "mixed reports" coming from Bridgewater: "Either the defendant
is [mentally ill] or he ain't."
Several courts in various jurisdictions agree with the conclusion that a
defendant can be mentally ill and yet competent to stand trial.45 In Lyles v.
United States, 46 the court stated that a defendant
may have a mental disease, and the mental disease may have been
the cause of his criminal act, and he may be suffering from the same
disease at the time of his trial; but it is a scientific fact that he nevertheless may become competent to stand trial under this [common
law] definition of competency. A paranoic or a pyromaniac may well
understand the charges against him and be able to assist in his defense. "To assist in his defense" of course does not refer to legal questions involved but to such phases of a defense as a defendant usually
assists in, such as accounts of the facts, names of witnesses, etc. .... 47
44. Ibid.
45. Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670 (W.D. Mo. 1951), aff'd sub nom. Higgins v.
United States, 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 870 (1953); United States v.
Gundelfinger, supra note 11; State v. Severns, supra note 9; Aponte v. State, 30 N.J. 441, 153
A.2d 665 (1959); Ex parte Hodges, 314 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958).
46. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958).
47. Id. at 729-30. Colorado is one of the few jurisdictions which recognizes this concept
in its statute:
The defendant is not to be considered as insane if he has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature and object of the proceeding against him and to rightly comprehend
his own condition with reference to such proceeding, and has sufficient mind to conduct
his defense in a rational and reasonable manner, although on some other subjects his
mind may be deranged or unsound. (Emphasis added.)
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-6 (1963).
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Dr. Rothstein, a psychiatrist at Boston State Hospital, agreed with Dr. Robey
and these cases on this question of whether one could be mentally ill and still
competent to stand trial. 48 He stated that some individuals can be paranoid
and deluded, "but in a very organized way." Even though he might recommend that such an individual is not criminally responsible, he believes that
this type of defendant would be competent to stand trial.
Thus, because of the total lack of judicial guidance as to the proper standard upon which an indefinite commitment should be based, the Medical
Director at Bridgewater was forced to fill this vacuum by communicating to
the committing courts the common law standard of competency to stand
trial. The courts which have refused to accept a finding that a defendant is
mentally ill but competent, and the courts which do not commit defendants
to Bridgewater and therefore have no contact with Dr. Robey, continue to
consider a defendant committable if the psychiatrist recommends to the
court that he is mentally ill and in need of further hospitalization. 49 It is only
in the past several years that some courts in Massachusetts have been forced
to relate the determination of the defendant's mental condition and the commitment procedures under Sections 100 and 105 to the question of the defendant's competency to stand trial, thereby developing an understanding
50
of the purpose which a pre-trial commitment is supposed to serve.
48. Interview with Dr. Rothstein, supra note 19.
49. This standard of pre-trial commitment, which has been developed over the years by
the courts and psychiatrists in Massachusetts, is embodied in the statute of only one state,
Pennsylvania; the Pennsylvania statute is designed to prevent the trial of a defendant who
"appears to be mentally ill or in need of care in a mental hospital." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
§ 1222 (1954). It has been observed that "the mental characteristics of a person which make
it 'necessary or advisable' that he be hospitalized are not parallel to those which fundamental fairness dictates must of necessity delay the trial of an accused pending his recovery."
F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRu, supra note 10, at 360.
50. It is interesting to note that in the District of Columbia (as well as in other jurisdictions), the statute which authorizes pre-trial commitment allows such commitment where
the court finds that: "mhe accused is of unsound mind or is mentally incompetent so as to
be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense...." (Emphasis added.) D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (a) (1967).
Under this type of statute, a dual standard for pre-trial commitment seems to be established-a defendant can be committed if he is incompetent under the common law definiLion and alternatively, he can be committed if he is considered to be of "unsound mind,"
regardless of whether or not this unsoundness affects his competency to stand trial. However, in Williams v. Overholser, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted this statutory standard to mean that "the [trial] court shall
order the accused confined in a mental hospital if it finds that because of unsoundness of
mind or for any other reason he is mentally incompetent to stand trial." (Emphasis added.)
259 F.2d 175, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The court then stated that the purpose of this section
"is simply to prescribe the procedure for determining whether an accused person can understand the proceedings against him and properly assist in his defense, and to provide for
his confinement in a hospital instead of a jail until he can." Id. at 177. Thus, even though the
statute strongly suggests that a court can commit a defendant found to be of unsound mind,
without the necessity of relating his mental condition to his ability to participate in the criminal proceedings, the Williams decision interpreted this possibility out of the statute.
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Raising the Issue of Defendant's Mental Condition.
There is no suggestion in Section 100 as to who may raise the issue of the defendant's mental condition before the court. In practice, the issue is usually
not raised prior to trial by either the defendant or his attorney. Where a defendant has a criminal record, the trial judge is alerted to the fact that the
defendant has a past history of mental illness by the probation department. 51
Where the trial judge has reason to question the defendant's mental condition, it has been held in another jurisdiction that he may order an inquiry
on his own motion, even over the objection of defendant's attorney. 52 Although no cases in Massachusetts deal with this problem, the terms of Section
100 explicitly allow the court to make such an inquiry, regardless of any objection by defendant or his attorney.
Another possible method of raising the issue of the defendant's mental
condition, leading to his commitment under Section 100, is the procedure
under Chapter 123, Section 100A, known as the Briggs Law. The Briggs Law
was the first American legislation to provide a routine psychiatric examination for certain classes of criminal defendants. A person indicted for a capital offense, a person who has been previously indicted more than once, and a
person who has been previously convicted of a felony must be examined by
the Department of Mental Health "with a view to determine his mental condition and the existence of any mental disease or defect which would affect
his criminal responsibility."58 The Briggs Law makes no provision for commitment, and the examination is intended to take place in jail (if the defendant is not out on bail) or wherever the defendant is told to report. A de54
fendant, however, is not required to submit to the examination.
One commentator optimistically stated that because of the Briggs Law, Massachusetts "has eliminated the problem of how the defendant's possible mental disorder at the time of trial is to be called to the attention of the court." 55
However, putting aside the value of such a law in clarifying the issue of crim51. Interviews with Chief Probation Officer Walter Lawler and Probation Officer John
Fleeming, supra note 19.
52. State v. Hebert, 186 La. 308, 172 So. 167 (1937); but see Ex parte Hodges, 314 S.W.2d
581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958).
53. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 100A (1958). Under Chapter 233, Section 23B, it is
stated that when a defendant is examined under the Briggs Law or Section 100, no statement made by him "for the purposes of such examination or treatment shall be admissible
in evidence against him on any issue other than that of his mental condition, nor shall it be
admissible in evidence against him on that issue if such statement constitutes a confession of
guilt of the crime charged." MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 23B (Supp. 1966). On this
problem of the conflict between the pre-trial mental examination and the privilege against
self-incrimination, see Danforth, Death Knell for Pre-Trial Mental Examination? Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 19 RurGEis L. Rav. 489 (1965).
54. Commonwealth v. Brody, 328 Mass. 521, 105 N.E.2d 243 (1952).
55. H. WEMOFEN, supra note 10, at 443. For a statement to the same effect, see also F. LiDmAN & D. MCINTYRE, supra note 10, at 561.
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inal responsibility at the trial itself, in practice, the Briggs Law does not play
an important role in determining the issue of the defendant's present mental
condition. Where a defendant who falls under the terms of the law has no
previous background of mental illness, he is usually induced to waive the
Briggs examination, and there is usually no commitment in such a case. This
occurs in a large percentage of the non-capital cases falling within the terms
of the statute. 56 If the defendant falling within the terms of the statute has a
background of mental illness or if he is charged with a capital crime, the
present practice is that the Briggs psychiatrist reports to the court which
requested the examination that the accused requires inpatient observation,
57
and the court orders the defendant committed under Section 100.
The issue of defendant's mental condition is perhaps most often called to
the court's attention by the district attorney. In interviews at the Middlesex County District Attorney's Office, a motive for the prosecutor's interest
in raising this issue emerged: it was argued that if there is no inquiry into the
defendant's mental condition, and the defendant is subsequently convicted,
this conviction could later be set aside on appeal or collateral attack on the
ground that defendant was not competent to stand trial. Thus, the state's interest in raising the issue of defendant's mental condition is in preventing a
costly trial that can later be set aside. This justification is more persuasive in
a case involving a felony rather than a misdemeanor; for in the latter type
of case, the expense and difficulty in achieving a conviction and the likelihood of subsequent attacks on the conviction are not nearly so great as in the
former.
However, even where the crime charged is a felony, the district attorney's
attempt to justify his practice of raising the issue of defendant's mental condition is not convincing. It has been pointed out that most committing courts
make no effort to determine a defendant's competency to stand trial. The
standard for indefinite commitment in these courts is simply whether the
defendant is mentally ill. There is a widespread assumption, shared by prosecutors and many trial judges, that a defendant who is mentally ill should
not be involved in any criminal proceedings, regardless of the fact that his
mental illness may not affect his ability to participate in these proceedings.
In raising this issue of the defendant's mental condition, therefore, the state's
aim cannot be viewed as an attempt to protect a conviction from subsequent
attack by a defendant who was incompetent to stand trial. Rather, the state's
aim is to avoid a trial altogether and to seek the indefinite commitment of
defendants who are regarded as mentally ill. What, then, is the state's interest
in seeking to commit such individuals?
56. Interview with Howard Colpitts, CriminalCourt Clerk, supra note 19.
57. Ibid.
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Based on the writer's observation of the Massachusetts practice and on the
reported cases from other jurisdictions, three such interests emerge. Where
the crime charged is a misdemeanor and where the defendant has a background of mental illness (such as previous civil commitments), one interest
is in short-circuiting the civil commitment procedure. While it is not considered vitally important that such a defendant return to court to face the
charges against him, it is considered important to institutionalize this type of
defendant in an efficient and time saving manner. Thus, the criminal charge
is often a pretext for an indefinite "pre-trial" commitment which is a more
summary procedure than that provided in most civil commitment statutes.
This is not to imply that the state has "evil motives" or that the state is attempting to permanently commit such individuals to a mental institution. In
many instances, the individuals involved present a nuisance to the administration of justice. It is believed that the commitment is not only in the individual's best interests, but also serves at least temporarily to relieve the
nuisance caused by such individuals to the community, the police, and the
courts. As one commentator, however, pointed out in describing the plight
of a person who is usually committed prior to trial for a misdemeanor, the
state mental institutions are also unable to cope with such individuals:
The group of chronic male recidivists cited are a taxing and difficult problem for the courts. Resources and technics [sic] for the
rehabilitation and treatment of such men continue to be very limited. It is not surprising that the courts should have recourse to State
Hospitals in such a situation. The group might be described as being
in psycholegal limbo, shuttling among courts, hospitals, and jail [sic].
They appear frequently before the courts, draining time and money
from the public treasury and are not deterred by punishment or
the traditional technics [sic] of probation. Psychiatrists, particularly
those in State Hospitals who are heavily burdened, do not regard
them as treatable or committable, label them with a characterological
diagnosis and return them to court. 8
Where the crime charged is a serious one, the state's interest in pre-trial
commitment shifts. As one court stated (in discussing the federal pre-trial
commitment procedure), underlying this procedure "is the concept of some
protection to society, as well as the preservation of the rights of an accused
person.''59 Thus, in State v. Swails,o6 the trial court recommitted the defendant (charged with murder) to the state hospital after the lunacy commission had advised that defendant was competent to stand trial, but likely to
become dangerous to the community if released. The trial court was thus
58. McGarry, A Review of Court Observation Cases at Boston State Hospital in 1960, 16
BOSTON MED.Q. 59, 63 (1965).
59. United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60, 65 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
60. 223 La. 751, 66 So. 2d 796 (1953).
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seeking "to anticipate the commission of crime by preventive treatment before a legally defined crime occurs." 6' 1 But the state supreme court rejected
such a reason as the basis of continued pre-trial commitment:
The apprehension and even the predictions of some of the physicians
that appellant may be a menace to society, if he is ever released, affords no basis whatever for holding him presently insane, within the
meaning of the law, or for recommitting him to an institution ...
Protection of the public from possible harm from the accused is not
62
envisioned by the law.
The extent to which its interest in preventive detention causes the state to
raise the issue of a defendant's mental condition in Massachusetts is not entirely clear; however, there is some indication that in certain cases, the state
does attempt to use the indefinite pre-trial commitment procedure to accomplish this goal. 63
A defendant who is considered extremely dangerous because of mental
instability, e.g., a psychopath, is often subject to pre-trial commitment, even
when there is no real doubt about his competency to stand trial. Although
this is not a justifiable use of the pre-trial commitment process, the state has
some interest in detaining a defendant prior to trial who is charged with a
violent crime and who has a record of prior convictions for similar crimes.
Often, preventive detention is accomplished by setting bail at an unattainably high figure, but it has been observed that this practice is unfair and
arbitrary. 64 In an effort to improve the present bail practice, one commentator proposes the establishment of a special proceeding "in the nature of a
civil commitment proceeding at the time of arraignment" to deal with those
cases where preventive detention is sought by the state. 65 A statute would
define the cases where this proceeding would be permitted, e.g., "obviously
pathological crimes." The government would be required to make a very
strong showing "to warrant the invocation of commitment" and the defendant would have the opportunity for a full hearing. All doubts would be resolved in favor of the defendant. Under this system, everything possible
would be done "to make this incarceration less personally destructive than
is present pretrial detention," e.g., separation from convicted prisoners. 66
Trial dates would be "expedited by giving calendar preferences to these
cases" and the time of pre-trial detention would be reduced from any subsequent sentence if defendant is convicted. Furthermore, "[t]he defendant
61.
62.
63.
64.

Note, 28 TUL. L. REv. 137, 140 (1953).
State v. Swails, supra note 60, at 759-60, 66 So. 2d at 799.
Interview with Dr. Robey, supra note 19.
R. GOLDFARW, RANSOM 127-48 (1965).

65. Id. at 245.
66. Id. at 247.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. XVlI

should be released at the time of trial, and the fact of his incarceration should
' 67
not be brought to the jury's attention."
While this commentator recognizes the dangers and the constitutional problems inherent in such a system, he correctly points out that preventive detention is practiced within the workings of the present bail system in a much
more arbitrary manner. To a lesser extent, the pre-trial commitment system
is also used for the purpose of preventive detention. The use of these two
processes to accomplish such detention is not only unfair to the defendant,
but is also difficult to justify in view of the stated purposes of bail and pretrial criminal commitment. A proposal such as that suggested above, therefore, warrants consideration simply because it recognizes the existence of
preventive detention in the present system and seeks to protect the rights of
the individuals involved as much as possible.
It has been stated that pre-trial commitment is "mainly employed to accomplish preventive detention" of dangerous individuals.68 But this sweeping
assessment overlooks another state interest in such commitments where the
crime charged is a serious one. This interest is in avoiding the formal trial
of the issue of the defendant's criminal responsibility. The desire to sidestep
the issue of criminal responsibility "through the medium of a lax appraisal
of defendant's fitness to proceed" is based on dissatisfaction with the criteria
for determining criminal responsibility. Two noted commentators stated
their approval of such a use of the pre-trial commitment procedure:
Reforms which it has been impossible to achieve through revision
of the tests of responsibility are being achieved through perfecting
means for preventing the trial of... mentally disordered defendants.
By making use of statutes which. . . provide for a period of observation in a mental hospital.., we discover that a number of such persons are too defective or disordered to understand the criminal proceedings or make a rational defense, and they are thereupon committed without having to stand trial ....
(Emphasis added.)
*9

The prosecutor's interest in the pre-trial commitment of this type of defendant is to avoid the expense and delay of a trial where the verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity seems inevitable. Since such a verdict would also
lead to the defendant's commitment to a mental institution, the pre-trial
commitment is said to accomplish the same result in a cheaper and more
efficient manner. Furthermore, there is a paternalistic attitude that a defendant who clearly appears to be mentally ill should not be "put through the
ordeal of a trial." There are, however, great injustices to the defendant in67. Id. at 248.
68. Slovenko, The PsychiatricPatient,Liberty, and the Law, 13 KAN. L. REV. 59, 69 (1964).
69. M. GUTrIMACHER & WEIHOEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 440-41 (1952).
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volved. The defendant may be innocent of the charge, but he is deprived of
the opportunity to clear himself by an indefinite commitment. In addition,
institutionalization under the shadow of a criminal charge hinders the effort
to effectively treat such an individual.
As a result of the prosecutor's initiative in raising the issue of a defendant's
mental condition prior to trial, many individuals charged with crime suddenly find themselves indefinitely committed to a mental institution, far removed from the criminal proceedings which originally brought them within
the state's authority. The impression emerges from observing the operation
of this system in Massachusetts that the defendant (and his attorney, if he has
one) plays an unimportant role in the procedure leading to an indefinite
commitment. The decision to initiate the commitment is often made by the
prosecutor and acted upon by the trial judge because of their firm conviction
that such commitments of mentally ill defendants are in the best interest of
the defendant and the criminal system.
The problem is that these commitments not only fail to make sense from
the point of view of the policy underlying the commitment procedure, but
they also jeopardize the defendant's right to equal protection of the laws and
his right to a speedy trial. Before discussing these constitutional objections,
we must turn to the actual operation of the procedure by which a defendant
ultimately finds himself indefinitely committed to a mental institution. It is
this procedure which fails to provide any safeguards to prevent these unnecessary and unjustifiable commitments, which are totally unrelated to any
idea of bringing a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial back into the
criminal process.
From Observation to Indefinite Commitment
After the issue of defendant's present mental condition is raised in one manner or another before the court, Section 100 seems to establish two types of
commitments. The court can either find that the defendant is "mentally ill
or in such mental condition that his commitment to a state hospital is necessary for his proper care or observation pending determination as to any mental illness ....70 (Emphasis added.) The latter type of commitment is referred to as an "observation commitment," and it is limited to 35 days under
Section 105. Where the trial court initially finds the defendant to be mentally
ill, however, he may be committed for as long as his condition requires; the
35 day limitation in Section 105 explicitly refers only to a commitment for
"observation pending determination as to any mental illness."
At present, the practice seems to be exclusive reliance upon the 35 day
70. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123 § 100 (1958).
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observation commitment. 71 Where the crime charged is a serious felony, such
as first degree murder, the observation commitment is often made by the
district court as a matter of course on the basis of a complaint. 72 Such commitments are made to Bridgewater, which is considered a security institution
(women in this category are usually sent to Boston State Hospital, since
Bridgewater has no facilities for women).7 3 The great majority of observation
commitments, however, are not made to Bridgewater and presumably involve individuals considered "less dangerous" than the Bridgewater population. In a study of 107 observation commitments processed at the Boston
State Hospital in fiscal year 1960, it was estimated that better than 80 percent
74
of the alleged offenses were misdemeanors.
Where the charge is a misdemeanor, the district court is the committing
court. One district court judge stated that he relies on the psychiatric clinic
assigned to his district court in order to avoid unnecessary observation commitments. He uses this clinic not only as a screening device to avoid unnecessary commitments, but also to provide outpatient psychotherapy where it is
necessary, thereby avoiding any commitment. In a study of 107 observation
commitments at Boston State Hospital in fiscal year 1960, it was found that:
[T]hose courts which had the services of a psychiatric court clinic
were able to screen out unnecessary commitments to a degree that
65% (13 of 20) of those committed by the courts were found to require further hospitalization, whereas the courts operating without
psychiatric consultation sent 86 persons of whom only 19 or 22% required further hospitalization. This suggests that with psychiatric
court clinic consultation in the court as many as 50% of the Section
100 commitments could be avoided. Such an arrangement would be
to the advantage of the court, the State Hospital and surely also to the
71. From 1956 to 1964 (inclusive), there were 8,256 observation commitments at the
.twelve state hospitals and from 1957 to 1964 (inclusive) there were 1,386 such commitments at Bridgewater. McGarry, Competency For Trial and Due Process Via the State Hospital, 122 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 623 (1965). Commenting on the figures for 1964, the author
stated:
The number so committed continues an increasing trend by the courts to use the state
hospitals for this purpose [pre-trial observation of defendants' mental status].
Thus, for the 12 hospitals administered by the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health, the 1,217 committed in 1964 represent a 66 percent increase over those commit'ted in 1956 [733].... A similar increase has been noted at the state hospital of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Bridgewater, under the Department of Correction
[from 137 in 1957 to 264 in 1964] ....
The pre-trial observation commitments in 1964 comprised better than 10 percent of all the
admissions to all Massachusetts state hospitals in 1964. SPECIAL COMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH,
A STUDY OF THE COMMITMENT AND HOSPITALIZATION LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH [OF MASSACHUSETrS] 83 (1965) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL COMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH].
72. In Massachusetts, a preliminary hearing on a crime involving a prison sentence of over
five years can be held in the district court, even though the trial for such a crime must ultimately occur in the superior court. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 218, § 30 (1958).
73. Interview with Dr. Rothstein, supra note 19.
74. SPECIAL COMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 71, at 84, 101.
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individuals who might be spared the stigma of a state hospital
75
admission.
This study concludes that these findings "are a strong argument ... for
requiring a physician's (hopefully a psychiatrist's) certification before commitment is resorted to." 76 This same judge, however, refused to go so far as to
require some type of screening procedure before a defendant could be committed for observation; he argued that in many cases, a psychiatrist is not
available, and in such situations, a judge should not be forced to choose between letting the defendant post bail or remanding him to jail.
There is usually no notice and hearing before an observation commitment.
One judge stated that if the commitment is unjustified, the defendant will be
quickly returned to court. This lack of notice and a hearing prior to an observation commitment is aggravated by the fact that most defendants involved
are unrepresented by counsel. The absence of counsel seems to violate Rule 10
of the Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which requires
that
if a defendant charged with a crime, for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed, appears in any court without counsel, the
judge shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to
represent him at every stage of the proceedingunless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel.77 (Emphasis
added.)
A district court judge, however, stated that in most cases involving misdemeanors, the defendant "elects to proceed without counsel" and signs a
waiver to that effect. Regardless of how harmful such a procedure is to the
interests of a person who will face the charge of a misdemeanor against him
in a normal manner, it seems incongruous to allow a defendant whose mental capacity is being questioned to sign such a waiver. At any rate, the present practice is to commit a defendant for observation without any notice and
hearing, and apparently, the defendant either does not protest such a commitment or his protests are not effectively communicated to the committing
court.
The observation commitment usually lasts from 10 to 34 days; in the rare
case that the hospital asks for more time to observe the defendant, the court
will extend the commitment for an additional 35 days. When the observation
is completed, the hospital sends a letter to the committing court in the nature
of a report on the defendant's mental condition. One commentator has
stated that the results of the observation commitment are highly successful:
75. Id. at 85.
76. Ibid.
77. MASS. Sup. Jim. CT. R. 10.
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In the instance of Section 100 [observation] commitments there are
obvious advantages to the court and to the subject as a result of such
inpatient study. A careful case workup, intensive study and close
observation should be of positive assistance to the court. .... 78
But in reality, the hospitals do not have adequate staff and facilities to
conduct a thorough examination of a committed criminal defendant. Indeed,
"it is complained that there are too many [observation] commitments called
for under Section 100, that the facilities of . . . Bridgewater . . . and of the
state mental hospitals not restricted to the criminally insane, are overburdened
by the number of cases referred to them."7 9 Thus, at Boston State Hospital,
where there is a constant effort to reduce the size of the total population in
order to improve the patient-staff ratio, doctors are burdened by a steady flow
of observation commitments.8 0 At Bridgewater, the Medical Director stated
that it was his policy to discourage needless observation commitments, and
thus, defendants are often sent back to court within several days after the
original commitment.
It is not surprising that the quality of these reports to the committing
court is far from adequate. Several judges complained that the reports were
usually vague and uninformative, written in medical terms with no reference
to the defendant's competency to stand trial or fitness to proceed. (This failure to discuss the defendant's competency to stand trial is certainly not the
fault of the psychiatrists, for as we have seen, the statute establishes no standard for competency and no clear standard has been developed.) Other reports speak only in terms of the defendant's responsibility for the crime, often using the language of the M'Naghten test.8' Such reports reflect the confusion of the Supreme Judicial Court in distinguishing between competency
to stand trial and criminal responsibility. Many of the reports are concerned
only with the question of whether the defendant is suffering from a mental
disease, thereby requiring further hospitalization. Even those reports, which
78. Flower, The Psychiatric Examination of Offenders in Massachusetts, in PSYCHIATRY
103 (P. Hoch & J. Zubin eds. 1955).
79. Kreutzer, Re-Examination of the Briggs Law, 39 B.U.L. REv. 188, 192-93 (1959).
80. Interview with Dr. Rothstein, supra note 19.
81. Two psychiatrists involved in the federal pre-trial commitment procedure also found
that the reports of pre-trial psychiatric examinations did not differentiate competency to
stand trial from mental illness or criminal responsibility. These reports also showed "a lack
of clarity as to what the Federal court wants to know in these situations." The examining
psychiatrist
tends to "throw the book" at the patient; he is likely to say that he is "legally insane,
doesn't know the difference between right and wrong, doesn't understand the nature
and quality of the act or the proceedings against him, and is incompetent to assist in his
defense." [The psychiatrist] seems to want to make sure that he answers all possible questions in advance-possibly to avoid being subpoenaed. The court usually goes along with
such an opinion, readily adjudicates the patient as incompetent and commits him ....
Settle & Oppegard, The Pre-Trial Examination of Federal Defendants, 35 F.R.D. 475, 480
(1964).
AND THE LAW
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do refer to the defendant's competency to stand trial, are hopelessly cursory.
Two such complete reports, furnished by a district court judge, were as
follows:
The staff finds the patient non-psychotic. He is competent to stand
trial, and we recommend return to court.
and:
The patient is psychotic and not competent. The formal diagnosis
made it Schizophrenic Reaction, Chronic Undifferentiated Type.
We recommend the patient's commitment to this hospital for care
and treatment.
According to this judge, the above reports are typical of those received from
most hospitals. While the purpose of the observation commitment should be
to evaluate the defendant's ability to stand trial for a criminal charge, it is
clear that this type of report provides no worthwhile information for a judge
who must decide whether a defendant should be indefinitely committed to a
state hospital.
When the report recommends indefinite commitment, the defendant is
usually not brought back to court from the hospital when such an experience
would be considered (by the hospital) detrimental to his mental health.
Thus, in many cases this commitment is accomplished by an "exchange of
letters" and the defendant is not brought back to the court which committed
him for observation.8 2 As a result of this procedure, there is usually no notice
to the defendant and no hearing prior to such an indefinite commitment.
Furthermore, a defendant can be indefinitely committed on the basis of a
complaint alone and therefore without ever having a probable cause hearing
concerning the crime with which he is charged.8
In addition to this lack of notice and hearing prior to an indefinite commitment, it appears that many of those who are indefinitely committed are not
represented by counsel; this is so despite the requirements in Massachusetts
that counsel be assigned at all stages of the proceeding.8 4 Even if courts as82. Interview with Dr. Robey, supra note 19.
83. One progressive aspect of the Massachusetts system of pre-trial commitment is that
the sentence of a defendant who is convicted after a pre-trial commitment is reduced by the
days spent in confinement in the mental institution. In In re Steams, 343 Mass. 53, 175 N.E.2d
470 (1961), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 127, § 129B (Supp. 1966), providing that sentence of any prisoner "held in custody awaiting
trial" shall be reduced by days spent in confinement, applied to the defendant committed
prior to trial.
84. Where the crime charged is a misdemeanor, the defendant is usually not represented
by counsel prior to an indefinite commitment; where the crime is a felony, however, it is
more likely that defendant will be represented by counsel. According to a random sample of
the court records of 69 indefinitely committed defendants at Bridgewater in 1963, 22 out of
36 committed from three superior courts were represented by counsel, whereas only 6 out
of the 33 committed from five district courts were represented by counsel. SPECIAL COMM.
ON MENTAL H..ALT, supra note 71, at 103. In view of Rule 10 of the Rules of the Massachusetts
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signed counsel automatically in these cases, however, there is a more serious
problem as to whether Massachusetts law requires notice and a hearing prior
to any commitment. A defendant's interests are not sufficiently protected because some courts, as a matter of practice, provide for notice and a hearing;
for a defendant is more likely to be indefinitely comnmitted simply by an exchange of letters.
The law in Massachusetts is not entirely clear as to whether notice and a
hearing is required for either an observation or an indefinite commitment.
In In re Dowdell,8 the Supreme Judicial Court held that notice and a hearing was not required for civil commitment, because:
The order of commitment settles nothing finally or conclusively
against the person committed. . . . He is entitled, as a matter of
right, to institute judicial proceedings under the statutes to determine the necessity and propriety of his confinement. . . . He is not,
86
therefore, deprived of liberty without due process of law ....
The holding of this case was specifically overruled in 1955 by Chapter 123,
Section 51, which required notice and a hearing in civil commitment cases in
these terms:
Upon receipt of an application for commitment the court shall
cause written notice to be personally served upon the person named
therein informing the said person of the application for commitment
and of his right to a hearing at which he can be present and be represented by counsel ....
The person served shall be allowed fortyeight hours in which to request a hearing, and further time, not less
than seventy-two hours, if desired for the preparation of his case....
If the person does not request a hearing, the court may order commitment. . . . In any commitment under sections ninety-nine through
one hundred and five, inclusive, where the person is before the court
in connection with a criminal matter, the court may commit the person to a mental institution in accordance with the provisions of said
sections and this section, but no additionalhearing as established by
this section need be held in addition to the hearings provided in
section ninety-nine through one hundred and five.8 7 (Emphasis
added.)
This last sentence of Section 51 was added in 1956 after an Attorney General's
opinion in May 1956 had stated that since "commitments under Section 100
are entirely different from commitments under Section 51," the procedure
Supreme Judicial Court, it is especially inconsistent that those who are indefinitely committed as "insane" are considered competent to intelligently waive their right to be represented by assigned counsel.
85. 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897).
86. Id. at 388, 47 N.E. at 1033-34.
87. MASs. GrN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 51 (1958).
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"for commitment under Section 100 should not be construed to include the
new notice and hearing provisions added to Section 51."88 Thus, it is clear
that the Section 51 procedure is not the procedure under Sections 100 and
105; but the Attorney General's opinion refused to express any opinion
"as to what hearing or notice, if any, apart from Section 51, may be required
for commitments under Section 100."8 9 (Emphasis added.) Sections 100
and 105 are silent on this question, and by their terms, they do not seem to
require any such notice and hearing.
In other jurisdictions, however, the courts have required notice and a hearing where the statute providing for pre-trial criminal commitment was silent
on this point. In In re Lutker90 and State ex rel. Smilack v. Bushong,91 it was
held that it would be a violation of due process of law to deprive a defendant
of notice and a hearing before committing him to a state hospital for observation and examination. In both cases, the courts read a requirement of notice
and a hearing into the commitment statute in order to preserve its constitutionality. In Bushong, the court stated that: "The sending of a person to an
institution for the criminal insane, even for a short time, is a serious matter
and his confinement there is as full and effective a deprivation of personal
liberty as is his confinement in jail."9 2 The court pointed out that the defendant's commitment was ordered "against his vigorous protest and where he
had pleaded not guilty to an indictment charging him with a misdemeanor
punishable only by fine."9 3 The reasoning in these cases would certainly
require such notice and a hearing prior to an indefinite commitment.
In In re O'Leary,9 4 the Supreme Judicial Court construed another Massachusetts law dealing with commitment to require notice and a hearing in
order to preserve its constitutionality. The case arose under Chapter 123,
Section 113, dealing with the commitment of defective delinquents. This
type of commitment differs from a pre-trial commitment in that the commitment under this section is a "final disposition of any criminal offence
charged."9 5 The court relied on Simon v. Craft,96 a case involving civil commitment in which the United States Supreme Court stated that "[t]he essential
88.

MASS. Op. ATT'y GEN. 92, 93 (May 31, 1956).
89. Ibid.
90. 274 P.2d 786 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954).
91. 159 Ohio St. 259, 111 N.E.2d 918 (1953).
92. Id. at 266, 111 N.E.2d at 921.
93. Ibid. In People ex rel. Anderson v. Superintendent, 40 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
the court said that "opportunity to be heard" contemplated by the New York statute prescribing the procedure for determining defendant's competency includes cross-examination
of witnesses, the right to confront the psychiatrists, and the right to offer evidence and produce witnesses on defendant's behalf.
94. 325 Mass. 179, 89 N.E.2d 769 (1950).
95. MASS. GEN. I.Aws ANN. Ch. 123, § 113 (1958).
96. 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
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elements of due process of law are notice and opportunity to defend. ' 9
court then stated that:

7

The

Without [notice and an opportunity to defend] there can be, in truth,
no real hearing. While section 113 expressly makes accessible to a
defendant and his attorney the report of the department of mental
health. . . before the hearing, there must be reasonable notice to a
defendant of the filing of an application for his commitment ...
[W]e construe section 113 as impliedly calling for notice in accordance with the elements inherent in due process. That section, therefore, is not unconstitutional as wanting a provision for notice of the
filing of the application to the person whose commitment as a defec98
tive delinquent is sought.
The Massachusetts legislature subsequently amended Section 113 and it now
explicitly states that "[i]f a person is found to be mentally defective, the court
shall give written notice to the person . . . that a hearing is to be held for his
commitment to a defective delinquent department." 99
The reasoning of the O'Leary case would seem to apply to indefinite pretrial commitments, for even though the criminal charges are not dropped
against the defendant (as in the case of a defective delinquent), the result
of both types of commitment is to detain an individual in a mental institution for an indefinite period of time. The fact that the charges are pending
would not give a court the power to commit without notice and a hearing
when it is denied this power in dealing with defective delinquents. As to the
observation commitments, O'Leary may not be controlling, since there is a
definite time limit on such commitments; but the reasoning in the cases discussed clearly supports the argument that "due process of law" requires notice and a hearing prior to these commitments as well. The justification for
extending this requirement to an observation commitment was expressed by
Weihofen:
The order of commitment, even though it is merely for a period of
observation which will not run for more than sixty days... is nevertheless a fairly serious interference with a person's liberty. He is
taken away from his family and his job, and subjected to a type of
confinement which may cast reflection upon his sanity in the minds
of some people. This, it is argued, should not be permitted to be
done ex parte, without notice and opportunity to be heard ....
[P]rovision for confinement in the hospital . . . raises more serious
constitutional doubts than mere provision for appointing impartial
experts to examine the defendant. 100
97. Id. at 436.
98. In re O'Leary, supra note 94, at 182, 89 N.E.2d at 771.
99. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 113 (1958).
100. Weihofen, Procedure for Determining Defendant's Mental Condition under the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 235, 240-41 (1956).
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Even if notice and a hearing were required prior to both an observation
commitment and an indefinite commitment, either by a judicial holding or
by a legislative amendment of Sections 100 and 105, such a requirement
would have little impact in practice. To begin with, the present practice of
allowing a defendant to waive his right to have counsel appointed by the
court would greatly hinder the defendant in objecting to either type of commitment. Even in the case where the defendant was represented by competent
counsel who could effectively present an argument to the court against commitment, the results in those courts which now provide for notice and a
hearing prior to an indefinite commitment indicate that a defendant has
little hope of overturning the hospital's recommendation that he be "committed as an insane person." The judges interviewed viewed this pre-trial
determination of the defendant's mental condition as a medical question,
which could best be answered by the psychiatrists at the state hospitals.
Where the report after observation states that the defendant is committable,
these judges accept this conclusion, regardless of their own impression of the
defendant's capacity, regardless of how informative the report is, and regardless of their notion as to what is the proper standard for commitment in
these cases. Despite the flimsy quality of the reports, most judges have great
respect for the psychiatrists making them and will inevitably follow their
recommendations. Thus, where the defendant's attorney requests a hearing
to contest a report recommending indefinite commitment, the only way that
he can persuade the court not to commit is to bring in a psychiatrist to testify that the defendant is not insane, committable, or incompetent to stand
trial.
This attitude was demonstrated clearly by one judge who was asked hypothetically what he would do if, in the light of a report recommending indefinite commitment, a defendant insisted that he was ready to be tried on the
charges against him, and if this hypothetical defendant demonstrated to the
judge in every way that he was perfectly capable of immediately standing
trial. It was also assumed that the defendant's attorney represented to the
court that the defendant was clearly able to assist him in preparing the case
for trial. The judge's response was that he would still commit the defendant,
no matter how "rational" he appeared to be, unless the defendant could
bring forth expert psychiatric testimony to support his contention that he
was capable of standing trial and was not committable. This judge stated
that he had no problem in determining whether a defendant was competent
to stand trial, since the report made this determination for him. He therefore
made it clear that he would not allow a defendant to stand trial on his statement alone and the representations of his attorney, where there was a report
recommending commitment. Where the report, however, did not recommend
commitment, the trial would proceed and the judge would not question the
defendant's mental condition.
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This deference of the committing court to psychiatric opinion tends to
put a great burden on an indigent defendant who might want to contest a
conclusion by the examining psychiatrist that he is committable. It has been
held that when a defendant is examined under the Briggs Law and found
criminally responsible, he is not entitled to another examination by a psychiatrist of his own choosing at state expense. The Supreme Judicial Court
stated that "[h]aving been examined by impartial experts the defendant
was not entitled as of right to a further examination at the public expense." 101
Even though the state psychiatrists may be truly impartial, the defendant
who can afford to choose his own psychiatrist is given an opportunity by the
committing courts to challenge a finding that he is committable. Since the
attitude of many judges seems to be that the defendant himself can do nothing
to convince them that he should not be committed, the ability to bring in
10 2
supporting psychiatric opinion becomes crucial.
Judicial deference to psychiatric opinion often results in those states
"where the statute provides that the defendant shall be committed to an
institution for observation and examination."' 10 Even though the Massachusetts statute provides for psychiatric observation, Section 105 makes it dear
that the court itself must make the ultimate decision whether to commit the
defendant. Furthermore, there are several decisions in Massachusetts which
indicate that those judges who are reluctant to allow their own observations
of a defendant to override the recommendation of a psychiatrist are abdicating to the psychiatrists on this issue. In Commonwealth v. Spencer, o4 the
Supreme Judicial Court, interpreting the forerunner of Sections 100 and
105, noted that after an observation commitment, the trial court can "determine for itself the question of insanity upon the reports made by the officers
or upon any other competent evidence."'0 5 (Emphasis added.) The court
added that the "purpose and legal effect of the statute is not to take away
from the court the jurisdiction to determine finally the question of the sanity
of the defendant, but to provide a place for his care and custody pending
07
the determination of that question."' 06 In Commonwealth v. Devereaux,
the court explained the trial court's role in determining a defendant's criminal responsibility for a crime. After pointing out that the trial judge had observed the defendant's conduct during the trial and heard him testify, the
court stated:
101. Commonwealth v. Belenski, 276 Mass. 35, 40, 176 N.E. 501, 505 (1931).
102. Where a court refuses to allow an indigent defendant in this situation to choose his
own psychiatrist at state expense, it could be argued that the defendant is being denied
"equal protection of the laws." Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
103. Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 593, 610 (1960).
104. 212 Mass. 438, 99 N.E. 266 (1912).
105. Id. at 443, 99 N.E. at 268.
106. Ibid.
107. 257 Mass. 391, 153 N.E. 881 (1926).
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The judge may well have been able to form a judgment as to legal
responsibility of the defendant for crime, based upon common sense
inferences and intelligent observation, more reliable as a practical
guide to accomplishment of justice than the refined distinctions and
technical niceties of alienists and experts in psychopathic inferiority.'0 8 (Emphasis added.)
Yet the trial courts have refused to rely upon "common sense inferences and
intelligent observation" in determining the issue raised under Sections 100
and 105.
The dangerous aspects of this abdication is that the psychiatrist, and not
the court, will in effect make the ultimate decision to suspend the criminal
proceedings, which is the inevitable result of a declaration of mental illness
or incompetency. But such a decision is purely legal, to be determined only
by the trial court. While the trial court can seek advice from the psychiatrist, the court alone should make the ultimate decision to suspend the proceedings.109
Even though the court in almost every case accepts the psychiatric judgment of the observation report, the statistics indicate that most defendants
committed for observation are not subsequently comrritted indefinitely.
Thus, at the twelve state hospitals, excluding Bridgewater, there were 1,594
indefinite commitments out of the 8,256 defendants sent for observation
from fiscal year 1956 through fiscal year 1964; at Bridgewater, there were
254 indefinite commitments out of the 1,1 11 defendants sent for observation
from fiscal year 1959 through fiscal year 1964.110 While these defendants who
are indefinitely committed comprise a very small percentage of the total number of criminal defendants in Massachusetts each year,l it is still essential
to consider the fate of such individuals. It must be remembered that these
are persons who are being detained in a mental institution merely because
criminal charges have been filed against them and they are considered mentally ill. It may be argued that their fate is no worse than that of any individual who is committed indefinitely to a mental hospital under the civil
commitment process in Massachusetts. But it is submitted that there are sig108. Id. at 395, 153 N.E. at 882. See also Gunther v. United States, 215 F.2d 493, 496-97
(D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
109. United States v. Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88 (D. Vt. 1955), is a case which illustrates the
absurdity which can result from a trial court's complete deference to psychiatric opinion.
In this case, the defendant, threatened with pre-trial commitment, submitted a cogently
written argument to the court demanding her right to a speedy and public trial. On the
basis of psychiatric evidence that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease which
was temporary and curable, however, the court found that although the defendant understood the nature of the charges against her, "she is unable to properly assist in or conduct
her own defense." Id. at 92. The court thus completely disregarded the defendant's written
argument which strongly indicated that she was very capable of conducting her own defense.
110. McGarry, supra note 71, at 623-24.
111. Id. at 624.
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nificant distinctions between the two types of commitment, distinctions which
seriously affect the legal status of the individual involved.
The Status of the Indefinitely Committed Defendant and a Problem of Equal
Protection
An individual subjected to indefinite civil commitment is given a better opportunity to avoid such commitment under the Massachusetts statute than
his counterpart on the criminal side. As discussed previously, Chapter 123,
Section 51, clearly prescribes the notice and hearing procedure required for
an indefinite civil commitment. In addition, Chapter 123, Section 1, indicates
some standard for civil commitments; it states in part:
"Mentally ill" person, for the purpose of involuntary commitment
to a mental hospital.., shall mean a person subject to a disease,
psychosis, psychoneurosis or character disorder which renders him
so deficient in judgement or emotional control that he is in danger
of causing physical harm to himself or to others, or the wanton destruction of valuable property, or is likely to conduct himself in a
manner which clearly violates the established laws, ordinances, conventions or morals of the community. 112
Admittedly, this standard is imprecise, and it is quite likely that in practice
many courts do not insist upon a showing of dangerousness. But this section
at least provides some guidance to a court which may doubt the validity of
civilly committing a particular individual. Under Sections 100 and 105,
however, the statute gives no such guidance. A court therefore can indefinitely commit a defendant simply on the basis that he is "mentally ill."
In addition, the criminal defendant can be indefinitely committed to
Bridgewater on the basis of a complaint without any notice or hearing and
without any proof that he is dangerous. Bridgewater is a security institution
for the criminally insane, and the prison-like atmosphere of this institution
does not aid an individual's recovery. Furthermore, it has been shown that
Bridgewater is understaffed and that it is difficult for patients there to receive
adequate treatment.118
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (1958).

113. In Nason v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 351 Mass. 94, 217 N.E.2d 733 (1966),
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts refused to issue a mandamus ordering the
Commissioner of Mental Health to make available to the petitioner proper care and treatment at Bridgewater, or in the alternative, to make proper care and treatment available

to him by transferring him to another state hospital. Nason had been indicted for murder
in 1962 and was committed during the pre-trial hearing to Bridgewater under Sections 100
and 105. In 1963, the Superior Court had ordered Nason transferred to another state hospital (he had subsequently been transferred back to Bridgewater); the court noted that in
the 1963 proceedings, the testimony had shown -that Bridgewater was "markedly understaffed" and that Bridgewater did not give treatment to its patients unless "it's an emer-

gency." The court also noted that at this 1963 proceeding, both the prosecutor and the
judge agreed that conditions at Bridgewater were deplorable.
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The Massachusetts statute thus prevents those who are civilly committed
from being sent directly to Bridgewater. A civilly committed individual "who
has made two or more attempts to escape" or who is considered dangerous
can be transferred to Bridgewater only under the following conditions:
[W]ritten notice must be given to the patient and to his nearest relative or guardian of the department's intention to transfer him to
Bridgewater... at least three days before such transfer. The notice
shall contain a statement that the patient has a right to appeal this
decision to the commissioner and a right to a hearing in a court ....
The court shall hear and determine whether or not the department
is justified in making the transfer under this section ....114
The major differences between the person who is civilly committed and
one who is criminally committed prior to trial are apparent after the commitment is ordered. To begin with, the status of the untried defendant is
clearly a criminal one, since Section 105 states that "[t]he word 'prisoner' as
used in this section shall include all persons committed under section one
hundred .... -115 As a result of this classification, a defendant, committed
under Sections 100 and 105 with charges outstanding against him, cannot take
advantage of the discharge and temporary release procedures available to a
civilly committed individual. Chapter 123, Section 89 states that the "superintendent [as well as a probate or superior court judge] may discharge any
inmate if it appears upon examination that he will be sufficiently provided
for... or that his detention in such institution is no longer necessary for his
own welfare or the safety of the public ....116 Chapter 123, Section 88 allows
the superintendent to permit a patient to "temporarily... leave such instituEven though the court held that mandamus was not a proper remedy, it stated that the
legality and constitutionality of confinement of prisoners at state hospitals, which had
smaller staffs and poorer facilities than other state hospitals, could be determined in other
proceedings and that "[ijn such proceedings the constitutionality of great differences in treatment might require judicial determination." Id. at 97, 217 N.E.2d at 736. In this regard, the
court observed that the respondent recognized in its brief that the right of an individual
committed during the pre-trial period "to care, observation and treatment" is implicit in Sections 100 and 105.
This right to care and treatment was recognized by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in the landmark decision of Rouse v. Cameron, 373
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). There the court held that a person mandatorily committed to
a mental hospital, after being found guilty by reason of insanity, has a statutory "right to
treatment" that is cognizable in habeas corpus. Although the ramifications of the Rouse
decision are as yet unclear, the reasoning of this decision and the language of the court in
Nason strongly indicate that those who have been indefinitely committed under Sections
100 and 105 can seek a writ of habeas corpus -to challenge the legality of their confinement by
showing that they are not receiving adequate care and treatment.
114. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 20 (1958). If an emergency exists, the transfer can
be made "forthwith"; however, the notice of the transfer must be given within 24 hours
and the patient still has the same right to a hearing.
115. Id. § 105.
116. Id. § 89.
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tion... for a period not exceeding twelve months," and any patient "who
has not returned to the institution at the expiration of twelve months shall
be deemed to be discharged therefrom." 117
On the other hand, Section 105 states:
If a prisoner under complaint or indictment is committed in
accordance with section one hundred, and such complaint or indictment is dismissed or nol prossed... the superintendent ... may
permit such prisoner temporarily to leave such institution in accordance with sections eighty-eight and ninety or may discharge such
prisoner in accordance with section eighty-nine .... 118
Thus, an individual criminally committed prior to trial cannot be unilaterally discharged or released by the mental institution, unless the charges
against him are dismissed or nol prossed."19 And even if the charges against
such an individual are dismissed, the superintendent of the institution still
has discretion to release or discharge him. In such a situation, the only justifiable purpose of the commitment, i.e., to enable the defendant to regain
his competency and return to trial, has disappeared, and yet the state still
retains the power to confine such an individual (who was not afforded the
protections of the civil commitment procedures) in a mental institution.
Perhaps the most serious disadvantage to the criminally committed defendant is the inability of the mental institution to "temporarily release"
him under Section 88. This procedure enables the institution to give a civilly
committed individual a trial period in which to adjust to the outside community. The criminally committed defendant with charges outstanding
against him is not, however, even allowed home visits or off the grounds
privileges. He cannot go out into the community for any reason, even when
such activity would be beneficial to him from a therapeutic point of view.120
Dr. Rothstein resented this aspect, more than any other, of the criminal commitment procedure. He stated that it greatly hindered the psychiatrist's
ability to adequately help the individual involved. It is therefore his practice
to press for a dismissal of the criminal charges, in order that the defendant
can fall under the exception established in Section 105. According to Dr.
Rothstein, psychiatrists want their patients out of the hospital as soon as
possible; but the existence of criminal charges interferes with this goal.
Despite these differences between the civil commitment process and the
pre-trial criminal commitment process, it was seen that an indefinite pre117. Id. § 88.

118. Id. § 105.
119. In the past, such action was rarely taken, but there is some indication at the present
time that the institutions involved are frequently requesting the court and the district attorney to do so, especially where the charge is a misdemeanor. However, in most cases, the
charges are not dismissed, and the defendant's status remains a criminal one under Section 105.
120. Interview with Drs. Robey and Rothstein, supra note 19.
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trial commitment in Massachusetts is often based on the grounds that the
defendant is mentally ill and requires hospitalization. A great many of these
commitments are in no way related to a defendant's competency to stand
trial. In effect, many pre-trial commitments are merely attempts by the state
to commit mentally ill individuals who happen to be charged with a crime
without going through the statutorily prescribed procedures for civil
commitment.
Such a practice was rejected in Williams v. Overholser.121 In that case, the
municipal court in the District of Columbia (presently, Court of General
Sessions for the District of Columbia) had ordered a pre-trial commitment
after finding that the defendant, who had attempted to enter a plea of guilty
to the charge of public drunkenness, was "of unsound mind." The municipal
court did not make any finding as to defendant's competency to stand trial.
Defendant then sought release from the hospital through habeas corpus,
and the district court ordered his release within ten days "unless ... the
Municipal Court determines petitioner's mental capacity to stand trial";
it then added that if defendant "is found incompetent to stand trial he will
be committed ....

If he is found competent to stand trial.., whether con-

victed or acquitted he will be returned to the mental hospital under the
prior commitment on unsoundness of mind."' 122 Defendant then appealed
from the district court's order, which the court of appeals viewed as final, subject to review: "Read with the opinion, [the order] determines that the appellant will be confined in a mental hospital, whether he is found competent
or incompetent to stand trial." 123 The court then held that both the municipal
court and the district court had abused the pre-trial commitment procedure:
Title 21 ... of the District of Columbia Code contains elaborate
provisions for commitment of persons alleged to be insane .... In
the present case, the Municipal Court and the District Court seem
to have thought that when the person suspected of insanity is also
accused of crime, Congress intends to bypass all those provisions
and safeguards and to permit any trial court ... to commit the
person to a mental hospital without benefit of a jury or of the Mental Health Commission, although he may be perfectly competent to
stand trial. We think Congress had no such intention. Such an intention, if it were plainly expressed, would raise serious questions of
due process of law and equal protection of the laws ....

The pur-

pose of [the pre-trial commitment section] ... is simply to prescribe
the procedure for determining whether an accused person can
understand the proceedings against him and properly assist in his
defense, and to provide for his confinement in a hospital instead of
a jail until he can. 2 4 (Emphasis added.)
121.
122.
123.
124.

259 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Williams v. Overholser, 162 F. Supp. 514, 517 (D.D.C. 1958).
Williams v. Overholser, supra note 121, at 176.
Id. at 176-77.
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It is true that in Massachusetts, the contrast between the procedural protections available to an individual prior to civil commitment and those
available to one prior to an indefinite pre-trial commitment is not so great
as in the District of Columbia. 125 But there are significant differences in the
status of the two types of processes after commitment. In Massachusetts, as
in the District of Columbia, a trial court should not be allowed to bypass
the procedures and safeguards under the civil commitment process by ordering the pre-trial criminal commitment of a defendant who may be mentally ill, but who has not been found incompetent to stand trial. To the extent that the Massachusetts statute itself permits such pre-trial commitments,
it would raise serious questions of due process and equal protection of the
laws. The cure for such a defect lies in perfecting the procedure of pre-trial
commitment so that only those defendants who are incompetent to stand
trial are committed; otherwise, the commitment has no relation to the criminal process and is merely a cheap method of committing those who would
normally be protected by the statutes governing civil commitment.
In Baxstrom v. Herold,1 26 the Supreme Court held that an individual finishing a prison sentence "was denied equal protection of the laws by the statutory procedure under which a person may be civilly committed at the expiration of his penal sentence without the jury review available to all other
persons civilly committed in New York."' 27 The Court said that "there is no
conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments."' 28 Relying primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in Cameron v.
Mullen 29 that an individual who did not raise the insanity defense could be
committed to a mental hospital only under the civil commitment procedure.
This case arose after the Supreme Court's decision in Lynch v. Overholser,30
where the Court held that a defendant who did not raise the insanity defense
was not subject to the mandatory commitment procedure in the District
of Columbia which applied to those found not guilty by reason of insanity.
The Court stated that commitment in such a case must be accomplished
either under the civil commitment provisions or under Title 24, Section 301
(a) of the District of Columbia Code, which allowed the trial court to commit
an individual prior to the imposition of sentence who was found to be of
"unsound mind" or "mentally incompetent" to stand trial.
125. In the District of Columbia. an individual faced with civil commitment has the right
to a separate hearing before the Mental Health Commission and to a de novo judicial hearing, with a jury if desired, on the issue of insanity. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 21-541 to -545 (1967).
126. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).

127. Id. at 110.
128. Id. at 111-12.
129. No. 20308 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 1967).
130. 369 U.S. 705 (1962). See also Arens, Due Process and the Rights of the Mentally Ill:
The Strange Case of Frederick Lynch, 13 CATHoLIC U.L. REv. 3 (1964).
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The court in Mullen, however, refused to follow the Supreme Court's
dictum in Lynch that Section 301 (a) would authorize commitment in such
a case, arguing that "serious constitutional doubts would attend any construction of [Section 301 (a) ] which authorized post-verdict indefinite confinement."' 31 The government attempted to justify the denial of the civil
commitment procedural safeguards and the use of the more summary criminal commitment in such a case by arguing that an accused found not guilty
by reason of insanity constitutes a greater danger to the community than
those civilly committed. But the court rejected this justification, noting that
it was similar to the justification offered by New York and rejected by the
Supreme Court in Baxstrom. The court in Mullen recognized that after
Baxstrom, propensity for criminal conduct is not relevant in determining
the procedures to be followed in making a judicial determination whether
an individual is mentally ill at all: "Baxstrom thus might be said to require
the conclusion that while prior criminal conduct is relevant to the determination whether a person is mentally ill and dangerous, it cannot justify denial
u8 2
of procedural safeguards for that determination."
Baxstrom and Mullen thus stand for the proposition that to commit one
serving a prison term or one found not guilty by reason of insanity to a mental institution without affording him the procedural safeguards established
under the civil commitment scheme constitutes a denial of equal protection
of the laws. In each case, the idea, that the expeditious criminal commitment was somehow justified because of the dangerous or criminal propensities of the individual involved, was flatly rejected.
In effect, the operation of the Massachusetts procedure of pre-trial
commitment arbitrarily withholds the notice and hearing and the postcommitment procedures provided under the civil commitment process from
those who are charged with crime in the same manner that New York and the
District of Columbia attempted to arbitrarily withhold such safeguards from
those completing a prison sentence and those found not guilty by reason of
insanity. The only basis for these pre-trial commitments is that the defendant is mentally ill, not that he is incompetent to stand trial. There is no
more justification, therefore, for avoiding the procedures of the civil commitment process in committing an individual charged with crime than there
was in committing Baxstrom and Mullen. In each of these cases, the state's
purpose was to expedite the commitment of mentally ill individuals who
happen to be involved in the criminal process by treating them as part of an
"exceptional class" and somehow less deserving of the procedural safeguards
afforded to those who are civilly committed. In each of these cases, no justifiable purpose is served in treating such individuals differently from any
other person subject to civil commitment.
131. Cameron v. Mullen, supra note 129, at 9.
132. Id. at 13.
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There is, however, a proper basis for pre-trial criminal commitment which
is not based on the dangerous and criminal propensities of the individual
involved. Where there has been a determination, after notice and a full
hearing, that a defendant is clearly unable to participate in the criminal proceedings against him, it would seem that the state has a legitimate interest
in committing such an individual to a mental institution, without following
the civil commitment procedure, for the sole purpose of enabling him to regain his competency. Unlike the situation of the prisoner in Baxstrom and
the defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in Mullen, when a
person has been properly found incompetent to stand trial, the criminal
charge is not decided, and there is a question of custody incident to the disposition of the charge. The criminal commitment, therefore, would be justified, and there would be a basis for treating these individuals differently
from those subject to civil commitment. But in order to avoid the constitutional pitfalls raised in Baxstrom and Mullen, there must be effective safeguards to prevent these pre-trial commitments from becoming merely another
means of indefinitely detaining a mentally ill person in a mental institution.
The recommendations in the third part of this study are designed to limit
the purpose of pre-trial commitments and thereby avoid this problem of
denying individuals equal protection of the laws.18 s
The Return to Court and the Denial of a Speedy Trial
An individual's best hope in avoiding a long and unnecessary pre-trial commitment is for the examining psychiatrist to distinguish between mental illness and incompetency to stand trial, thereby recommending indefinite commitment only for the defendant whose mental illness clearly impairs his ability to participate in the criminal proceedings. As previously discussed, most
psychiatrists in Massachusetts will recommend such commitment for any de133. The Supreme Court in Baxstrom also cast doubt on the Massachusetts procedure
whereby a defendant, who has been committed under Sections 100 and 105, can be directly
committed to Bridgewater without the notice and hearing and the showing of dangerousness
required to transfer those who are civilly committed to Bridgewater. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 123, § 20 (1958). The Court held that the petitioner was
further denied equal protection of the laws by his civil commitment to an institution
maintained by the Department of Correction [as is Bridgewater] beyond the expiration
of his prison term without a judicial determination that he is dangerously mentally ill
such as that afforded to all so committed except those, like Baxstrom, nearing the expiration of a penal sentence.
Baxstrom v. Herold, supra note 126, at 110.
The Court assumed that this institution was significantly different so as to affect the fundamental rights of one sent there, since the statute itself had made this assumption in
putting it under the supervision of the Department of Correction rather than that of the
Department of Mental Health. In Massachusetts, as well as in New York, "[t]he capriciousness of the classification employed by the State is thrown sharply into focus by the fact that
full benefit of a judicial hearing to determine dangerous tendencies" for the purpose of being
sent to such a functionally distinct institution is granted to those who are civilly committed
and withheld from -those who are committed as mentally ill prior to trial. Id. at 115.
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fendant who is mentally ill, without inquiring into his competency to stand
trial. Once commitment is recommended, the die is cast, and the defendant
will spend an unlimited amount of time in a mental institution.1 34
Even when the defendant's condition, however, has improved to the point
that he can be returned to court, this return is often delayed for a long period
of time. Under Section 105, the mental institution is given sole responsibility
for returning the defendant to court. But the tendency of many of these institutions, to discharge patients as quickly as possible in order to reduce the
total patient population and thereby improve the patient-staff ratio, does
not exist in cases of pre-trial commitments. To begin with, some psychiatrists
are reluctant "to set in motion the proceedings for trial" where there is a
belief that the stress of the trial may adversely affect the defendant's mental
condition. Where the crime charged is serious and the issue of criminal responsibility is likely to be raised at the trial, the psychiatrist realizes that he
will probably be called to court to testify; in "the balancing of the decision to
discharge," this consideration will also "weigh against return to trial, particularly in an overcrowded, understaffed hospital." 135
Perhaps the most basic explanation for the tendency of these defendants
to simply get lost in the process is the fact that the additional burden of dealing with pre-trial commitments is often a great strain on the facilities of understaffed mental institutions:
Where the institution is understaffed, however, and the staff properly is concentrating its energy on new observation patients, recovered
patients stand a great risk of being lost on the back wards with their
recovery unexploited and no easily invoked opportunity for psychiatric or judicial review of their situation .... Inevitably, an insti-

tutionalization takes place with the receding hope of rehabilitation
as the years pass. 186
Even though the statute places sole responsibility on the mental institu134. The psychiatrists interviewed and other commentators were in complete agreement
that an individual with criminal charges pending is less likely to respond to treatment than
one who is civilly committed. As one writer stated:
[T]he improved patient who is criminally committed, unlike his peers, looks forward
not to freedom but to the anxiety-provoking prospect of an appearance in court and, if
guilty, sentencing....
The net effect, then, of an indefinite pre-trial criminal commitment weighs in the direction of obstructing rehabilitation and the return of the individual to society.
McGarry, Competency For Trial and Due Process via the State Hospital, 122 AM. J. PsYcuATRy 623, 626 (1965).
An illustration of the effect of an outstanding criminal charge occurred when a group
from the Law-Medicine Institute of Boston University attempted to screen indefinitely committed defendants at Bridgewater who were competent to stand trial. Dr. McGarry, one of
the members of the Institute, reported that some individuals initially considered competent
to stand trial regressed to a point where they were no longer considered competent because
of the threat of the actual return to trial. Id. at 629.
135. Id. at 626.
136. SPECIAL COMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 71, at 87-88.
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tion for initiating the procedure to return a defendant to court, nothing in
the statute prevents the committing court from attempting to remedy this
situation by periodically checking the defendant's progress. But courts, too,
are overburdened, and this effort is not made. Each judge interviewed admitted that no attempt was made by the committing court to even inquire
about an individual who had been indefinitely committed. As far as the court
is concerned, the case is in indefinite suspension.
Thus, a defendant who may have been competent to stand trial at the time
of his commitment can remain in a mental institution, even though his mental condition "is such that he should be returned" to court. 187 The question
inevitably arises whether such detention violates the defendant's right to a
speedy trial, guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Although this
right is considered "a basic concept of our system of justice,"'u 8 it is a relative
right, consistent with delays and dependent upon circumstances; this guarantee of a speedy trial "secures rights to a defendant" but does "not preclude
the rights of the public justice."' 8 9 It has been said of the incompetent ac'140
cused that "during the time he is mentally in abstentia,time ceases to run.
Criminal proceedings are suspended during the period of incompetency, but
the jurisdiction of the court continues. When defendant's competency is restored, the case may proceed as if nothing has intervened. In Williams v.
United States,14' Judge Bazelon stated:
To hold that delay occasioned by the accused's mental incompetence.., always requires dismissal of his indictment would be to ignore the "rights of public justice." On the other hand, to resume
the prosecution of the accused after long delay may in some circumstances violate his rights beyond the requirements of public
142
justice.
137. According to one judge, the mental hospitals with which he is familiar return an
individual to court as soon as it is possible to do so. At Bridgewater, there has been much improvement within the past several years in shortening the time of an indefinite pre-trial commitment. As the 1961 study of Bridgewater indicated, the most startling abuses of this commitment procedure occurred at Bridgewater. However, the work of the staff at the LawMedicine Institute of Boston University has done much to improve the situation at this
institution. Since the fall of 1963, 193 indefinitely committed defendants have been examined, and on the basis of one screening examination, 68 (35 percent) were evaluated as competent to stand trial; as of December 1965, 42 of these individuals (one of whom had been
hospitalized for forty years) have already stood trial. McGarry, supra note 134, at 629. In
addition, Bridgewater reduced the number of indefinite commitments from 56 in 1963 to
50 in 1964 despite a rise in its number of observations from 220 in 1963 to 264 in 1964; this was

attributed -to a "greater sophistication in the evaluation of competence for trial." McGarry,
supra note 134, at 629.
138. United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230, 232 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
139. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
140. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE DISTRIar OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, REPORT OF THE COMM.
ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES,
BEFORE TRIAL, at 145 (1964).

141. 250 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
142. Id. at 21.
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An indefinite pre-trial commitment would not violate a defendant's right
to a speedy trial if it is for the purpose of treating a defendant, considered
incompetent to stand trial, in order that he can be returned to trial. If the
hospital confinement is lengthy, however, the prosecution may be compelled
to prove that no prejudice resulted to the defendant from any delay, apart
from that attributable to the inevitable postponement necessitated by treatment. In Williams,1 43 the court said that the delay of seven years was "beyond
the ordinary" and that the defendant was seriously prejudiced in preparing
a defense based on a lack of criminal responsibility for the crime with which
he was charged. The court therefore held that "since the delay has been substantial" and since the Government failed to show that the defendant sufferred no serious prejudice "beyond that which ensued from the ordinary
and inevitable delay," the conviction should be reversed and the case re144
manded with instructions to dismiss the indictment.
In Williams v. Overholser,145 the trial court failed to make a determination
of the defendant's competency to stand trial; it found merely that the defendant (charged with public drunkenness) was of "unsound mind" and
committed him on that basis, with the criminal charge still pending. The
district court noted that an accused could be of "unsound mind" and yet
competent to stand trial. The court then held that the failure of the trial
court to make a determination on the issue of defendant's competency to
stand trial "resulted in a denial of a right given him by the statute as well as
his right, if competent, to a speedy trial under the Constitution."'46 (Emphasis
added.) On the basis of the reasoning in this case, most of the indefinite
pre-trial commitments in Massachusetts have violated the defendant's right
to a speedy trial, since these commitments were ordered without any showing
whatsoever of the defendant's incompetency to stand trial. The state cannot justify the delay by simply asserting that the defendant was confined in
a mental hospital because of his "mental illness." The only justifiable basis
for such confinement is that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial.
In State v. Swails,' 47 the court recognized the accused's right to be tried if
he meets the conditions of the common law test of "present sanity," even
though, judged by other criteria, he should remain hospitalized. In this case,
the lunacy commission had reported to the trial court that although the defendant was competent to stand trial, he was likely to become dangerous to
the community if released. The court rejected this latter ground as a basis
for further pre-trial commitment, arguing that "to deny him a trial for such
a speculative reason would ... infringe upon his fundamental right of due
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Williams v. United States, supra note 141.
Id. at 26.
162 F. Supp. 514 (D.D.C.), modified, 259 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Id. at 517.
223 La. 751, 66 So. 2d 796 (1953).
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process of law and to be accorded a speedy public trial vouch-safed by ...our
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
148
United States."
And finally, the court in Ex parte Hodges 49 invoked the right to a speedy
trial to cast doubt on the procedure whereby a district attorney presses for
the defendant's pre-trial commitment over the strong objections of defendant. The defendant's counsel "vainly protested the impaneling of a jury
[prior to trial] to pass only upon the issue" of defendant's present insanity;
the defendant's counsel also stated that he was "ready for trial on the indictment for murder without raising the question of insanity" and was not raising the question in defense or in bar of the prosecution. 150 A jury was impaneled, defendant was found insane at the time of trial, and under this finding, he was ordered committed to a state mental hospital. The appellate
court reversed, finding nothing in the statute which would authorize such a
preliminary trial "being held over the protest of defendant's counsel."' 15 The
court then held that:
By the action of the trial court in declining to proceed to trial in
the murder case, and in requiring a preliminary trial to determine
the sanity of the defendant over protest of his counsel, the defendant has been deprived of his rights guaranteedby the 6th Amendment of the Constitutionof the United States, and by. . .the Constitution of Texas ...to a speedy trial and to the effective aid of counsel.' 52 (Emphasis added.)
These cases recognize the seriousness of detaining an individual in a mental institution for an indefinite period on no firmer basis than a criminal
charge and a declaration that he is mentally ill. This pressure on the rights
of individual defendants would be greatly reduced if the state viewed the
pre-trial commitment procedure simply as a means of enabling an incompetent defendant to participate in the criminal proceedings. The pre-trial
commitment procedure in Massachusetts, however, is easily used by the state
for the purpose of detaining certain defendants in custody without the necessity of a formal trial or even a hearing. When it is not so used, it tends to operate in a somewhat aimless manner. There are no external checks to prevent the abuses of such a system. Even though the indefinitely committed defendant can seek a writ of habeas corpus, this is rarely done, and a system
which is inherently abusive is not cured by the fact that the writ is available.
The system must be reformed at the front end if the traditional respect for
the rights of individuals charged with crime is to be preserved.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 759, 66 So. 2d at 799.
314 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958).
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
Ibid.
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IlL Suggested Reforms of the MassachusettsPre-TrialCommitment
Procedure
Any procedure for the commitment prior to trial of persons
charged with a criminal offense necessarily involves some limitations upon personal liberties.... While a pre-trial mental examination of an accused of doubtful competency is absolutely essential if
we are to avoid trying the incompetent, this examination and any
ensuing commitment must not themselves be allowed to defeat the
justice they seek to achieve. For this reason such procedures must
be carefully scrutinized to see that the essential rights of the accused
are recognized and respected to the greatest possible extent.158
In suggesting reforms of the Massachusetts pre-trial commitment procedure,
a system must be devised which recognizes the limited purpose of such a
commitment and which seeks to protect the right of an individual charged
with a crime to due process of law, to equal protection of the laws, and to a
speedy trial. As we have seen, the present system has totally failed in these
respects.
In seeking to define and thus limit the purpose which a system of pre-trial
commitment should be designed to achieve, it is necessary to determine the
proper standard for such commitments. As previously pointed out, the only
justification for this type of commitment is to enable a defendant, considered incompetent to stand trial, to face the criminal charges against him in
whatever manner he chooses. The common law standard of competency to
stand trial is broad, and it does not precisely identify the type of behavior
by a defendent which would indicate his incompetency. But as previously
discussed, many cases have held that the test is not so broad as to make any
finding of mental illness tantamount to incompetency to stand trial. These
cases recognize that a defendant's particular form of mental illness may have
no effect on his understanding of his predicament and his willingness to assist in his defense. Thus, in Cox,15 4 the defendant was probably mentally ill
and operating under a delusion when he killed his wife. Yet, the defendant
understood that he was being charged with murder (and the consequences
of such a charge), and he was sufficiently rational to assist his lawyer in preparing a defense.
A determination of a defendant's mental competency should include a consideration of the complexity of the case, for "the capacity to stand trial may
increase or diminish inversely with the complexity of the charge lodged
against the accused." 155 Another factor which should be considered in determining defendant's competency is the severity of the charges against him.
Thus, where the charge is first degree murder, the defendant's inability to
153. Note, 51 GEo. L.J. 143 (1962).
154. Commonwealth v. Cox, 327 Mass. 609, 100 N.E.2d 14 (1951).

155. Slough & Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial,21 U. Prrr. L. REv. 593, 602 (1960).
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relate facts to his lawyer would be more detrimental than where the charge
is assault and battery or breaking and entering.
The common law test of competency establishes sufficiently broad criteria
to allow the consideration of such factors. It is an acceptable test, since it
focuses the determination upon the question being asked, i.e., can the individual "play the role" of a criminal defendant? The test merely lists the most
basic criteria for determining whether a defendant has this capability. Unlike the Massachusetts statute, it does not use such terms as "mental illness"
and "insanity," the use of which only serve to confuse the purpose of the
competency determination. As such, Sections 100 and 105 should state this
common law test, or some variation of it, omitting any reference to "mental
illness" or "insanity." The Massachusetts statute should even state that
where a defendant meets this common law test, he should be considered
competent to stand trial, "although on some other subjects his mind may be
deranged or unsound."' 5 6
Thomas Szasz rejects the notion that there is any connection between
mental illness and incompetency to stand trial. 57 He argues that it is judges
and lawyers, rather than psychiatrists, who possess the necessary experience
to make a determination of the defendant's competency. If it is clear that
the court must not allow psychiatrists ultimately to determine a defendant's
competency to stand trial, as Mr. Szasz argues, then why should the psychiatrist be allowed to play any role in this determination? 58
Dr. Rothstein of Boston State Hospital submitted that in a few situations,
a person's particular form of mental illness may not be superficially apparent. It is for the purpose of detecting these situations that he would favor a
psychiatric examination and a report to the court. While it is beyond the
scope of this analysis to examine the full implication of Mr. Szasz's argument rejecting any psychiatric examination, it seems that he does go too far
in stating that there is no causal connection between mental illness and incompetency to stand trial. It is not inconceivable that a particular mental
illness could have a direct impact on a defendant's competency. A psychiatrist should be allowed to call the court's attention to any such direct relationship between a defendant's mental illness and his competency to stand
trial. The court, however, must draw its own conclusions from such a rela156. See COLO. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-6 (1953).
157. T. SzAsz, PsYcHIATRc JusTIcE 252 (1965).
158. The Medical Director at Bridgewater has suggested that the special skills of the psychiatrist can be of particular value to the court in assessing the patient's "susceptibility to
decompensation" under the scope of the court's abilities. But if a defendant can understand
the charges against him and assist in his own defense, it is not relevant that under the stress
of trial, he may "decompensate" to such an extent that he is no longer competent. Even a
perfectly normal defendant can break down under the stress of a trial; and yet, no attempt
is made to screen such defendants prior to trial. Thus, what a defendant's future behavior
is likely to be is a problem with which the trial court can deal in due time; speculation should
not be a basis for determining a defendant's present capacity to face the charges against him.
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tionship. Thus, the court may decide that, even though the defendant is suffering from a mental illness which affects his ability to assist in his own defense, the severity of the charge and the nature of the case do not require
that the criminal proceedings be suspended. It has been stated that a court
often makes this type of decision:
The ultimate question-whether or not the proceedings should be
stayed-is not peculiarly within the competency of the psychiatrist.
Rather, the answer hinges not only upon an accurate diagnosis of
the defendant's condition but also upon a judicious balancing of the
social advantages of prompt adjudication under circumstances less
than ideal, against the unfairness of subjecting a defendant to trial
under mental handicaps. Courts and legislatures regularly make
judgments of this kind. It is unlikely that a better balance would
be struck by those who by training and inclination attach singular
importance to the therapeutic necessities of the case.' 59
If the psychiatrist is to be used to advise the court on the issue of defendant's competency to stand trial, it is crucial that he be informed by the court
of the tasks which a criminal defendant should have the ability to perform.
It should be made perfectly clear to the psychiatrist that the issue is not
whether a defendant is suffering from a mental illness which may be curable
by commitment to a mental institution. Two psychiatrists whose study of
the Michigan system convinced them of the confusion inherent in determining competency to stand trial made the following suggestions:
We would suggest that attention be paid to the intentions and goals
of competency proceedings so that such proceedings be restricted
only to those criminal defendants who appear to be appropriate objects for competency determinations. In addition, courts and attorneys could profitably clarify in their own minds what sorts of information they would require from the psychiatric expert, inform him
accordingly, and take steps to ensure that the expert provides this
in understandable terms and with sufficient scientific data to support his conclusions. Finally, the law should recognize that the entire matter of competency to stand trial is a legal matter and that
the legal influence does not stop when an individual is found to be
incompetent. Undoubtedly, efforts should be expended to educate
psychiatrists ... as to the goals of the competency proceedings. 160
Turning to the operation of the procedure for determining defendant's
competency to stand trial, it is suggested that only the defendant or the trial
judge should be allowed to raise this issue. Under the present practice, the
district attorney also has this right. The justification for allowing him to do
159. Note, Amnesia: A Case Study in the Limits of a ParticularJustice, 71 YALE L.J. 109,
129 (1961).
160. Hess & Thomas, Incompetency to Stand Trial; Procedures, Results, and Problems,
119 AM. J. PsYcHiATRY 713, 718 (1963).
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so is the state's interest in preventing the unnecessary trial and conviction
of a defendant who is subsequently held to have been incompetent to stand
trial. The objection in allowing the district attorney to raise the issue of defendant's competency is that the state's ultimate interest may be in commitment of the defendant as an end in itself and not in his restoration to competency. As has been stated, such an interest is not justifiable. The possibilities of abuse of the pre-trial commitment system are lessened by preventing
the state from setting in motion the procedure which could ultimately lead
to defendant's indefinite commitment.
The trial judge, unlike the district attorney, traditionally has had the
power to inquire into the defendant's physical or mental condition at every
stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant's counsel, however, decides
not to raise the issue of defendant's competency, then his decision should be
given great weight by the trial judge in deciding whether to pursue such an
1
inquiry. Ex parte HodgesO
' illustrates this point. The common law test of
competency is based on the notion of the defendant's capacity and willingness to effectively assist in his own defense, and the defendant's counsel is
obviously in the best position to determine whether the defendant has such
capacity. Thus, the trial judge should raise the issue of a defendant's competency to stand trial only when he is convinced that the defendant's attorney is clearly incorrect in not doing so; if the trial judge does raise the issue
over the objections of the defendant's attorney, he should be required to
162
clearly state his reasons on the record.
If this decision is left primarily in the hands of the defendant's counsel,
a problem might arise when he seeks to raise the issue, and the defendant
objects to any inquiry into his competency. The trial court should have some
discretion in such a situation. It should be allowed either to appoint or to
assign new counsel to represent defendant or to initiate an inquiry into the
defendant's competency where it has some basis for believing that the defendant is in fact incompetent.
Once the issue of defendant's competency has been raised, the court should
have the discretion to seek a mental examination of the defendant. At this
point, the defendant must be represented by counsel, and he should not be
allowed to waive this right. Where possible, such examination should be
conducted on an outpatient basis; however, where the court believes on the
basis of a hearing that an observation commitment is necessary, then it
should be allowed to commit the defendant for a period of no more than
161. 314 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1958). See also Hess & Thomas, supra note 160.
162. A decision not to raise the issue of the defendant's competency should constitute a
waiver in any subsequent attack on the conviction based on the argument that the defendant
was incompetent at the time of trial. If, however, it can be shown that the failure to raise the
issue was a result of the defense counsel's ineffectiveness, then this waiver rule would not
apply.
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ten days. 168 At the end of the commitment, the examining psychiatrist should
make a written report to the court. If the psychiatrist concludes that the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial, he should be asked to state whether
defendant can be effectively treated on an outpatient basis.
When the examining psychiatrist concludes that the defendant is competent, and the court agrees, then, unless the defendant objects, the normal
criminal proceedings can be resumed. When the report, however, states that
defendant is incompetent or when defendant's counsel objects to the court's
preliminary conclusion that the defendant is competent, then the court
should order a hearing, giving proper notice to the defendant and his counsel. Defendant's counsel should be provided with a copy of the report prior
to the hearing.
At the hearing itself, the court, in considering the defendant's capacity to
stand trial, should apply the common law test strictly; that is, a defendant
should be presumed competent, unless the court is convinced that he is incompetent by a preponderance of evidence. The court should make this
determination with the idea that it is both in the state's interest and in the
defendant's interest for a defendant to face the charges. A delay in disposing
of the case which would result from a finding of incompetency would prejudice both the state and the defendant in subsequently preparing for a trial.
Delays are of course inevitable in the administration of criminal justice, but
the court should avoid adding extra delays to those which already exist.
The court must first decide whether and to what degree the defendant's
capacity to stand trial is impaired. Even when the psychiatrist's report concludes that defendant is incompetent, the court should give primary consideration to its own impression of the defendant's capacity. Thus, if the
court believes the defendant competent, it is not only entitled but should be
obliged to proceed with the trial. When the defendant's counsel maintains
that defendant is incompetent, the court must of course give considerable
consideration to his argument. The decision to suspend the criminal proceedings, however, must be controlled by the trial court. It cannot be delegated to either the psychiatrist or the defendant's counsel. Thus, when the
court believes that the defendant is rational and understands his predicament, and yet defendant's counsel insists that the defendant is unable to assist in his own defense, the court then may conclude that the problem is in
defendant's inability to communicate effectively with a particular lawyer.
The court should therefore have the discretion to appoint or assign new
counsel with the expectation that the problem will thereby be eliminated.
163. There should be no observation commitments or indefinite commitments made to
Bridgewater unless the defendant has been determined to be dangerous and unsuited for confinement at any other state hospital. Such a determination should be made only after the
defendant and his attorney have been given notice and have been afforded a full hearing on
the issue of dangerousness.
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If the court concludes that defendant is clearly incompetent to stand trial,
then it is at an important crossroad. What the court must avoid is a disposition of the defendant's case which could lead to indefinite commitment in a
mental institution with a criminal charge outstanding. The only justification for this type of commitment is that the defendant may respond to treatment sufficiently to be able to face the charge against him. When the charge
against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the interest in having an individual
face such a charge is less than where the charge involved is a felony. In addition, where a person charged with a misdemeanor is committed, he often
spends more time in a mental institution than he would have served in jail
if convicted. On balance, therefore, it would be desirable to eliminate pretrial commitments in a class of cases where the result to be achieved by
such a commitment, i.e., recovery of a defendant to a point where he can return to court, is not of vital importance to the administration of criminal
justice. The charges against this type of defendant would not be dropped,
and the district attorney would be allowed to reopen the case at any time
when the defendant's mental condition is such that he can face the charges
against him. If the defendant is considered dangerous to himself or others,
the state can institute civil commitment proceedings against him. If he is so
committed, the criminal charges would be dropped. It is arguable that when
such a defendant is not civilly committed, he would be allowed to remain
unconfined with the prospect of never being tried for the misdemeanor. But
this is what often occurs when a defendant is not brought to trial because of
such a physical infirmity as a severe heart condition.
When the defendant considered incompetent to stand trial by the court
is charged with a felony, then the state's interest in bringing such a defendant to trial, at least in theory, is sufficient to warrant some type of disposition by the court which will accomplish this result. This does not necessarily
mean that all such defendants must be committed to a mental institution.
In some cases, the psychiatrist or the court may believe that the defendant
can effectively be restored to competency with the aid of outpatient treatment. Thus, in the case of Bernard Goldfine, the court permitted such outpatient treatment on the ground that "the petitioner is presently incompetent
to stand trial; that as of now his condition so far as it affects his competency to
stand trial, is not improving at St. Elizabeth Hospital, where he is confined,
and he is not likely to improve so long as he is under confinement .... 1 ,6 4 The
court further found that "the probabilities of his recovering competence are
less in confinement than if he is permitted to return to a normal environment with outpatient psychiatric and medical treatment .. .. ",165Similarly,
164. The opinion of the case is unreported, but may be found in, J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN &
A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS PSYCHIATRY AND LAw 692 (1967).

165. Ibid.
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in United States v. Klein,16 where the psychiatrist who had treated a defendant found incompetent to stand trial for more than 30 years insisted that institutionalization would prove "catastrophic," the court held that the record did not furnish sufficient grounds for pre-trial commitment:
[T]he only controversy concerns treatment.... Accordingly, where
a defendant such as Klein is receiving extensive psychiatric care and
there is no question as to the integrity and high professional competence of his personal psychiatrist, we do not consider [the pre-trial
commitment statute] as intended to compel the District Court to
determine which of two equally reputable methods of psychiatric
167
treatment would prove most efficacious in a particular case.
The Massachusetts statute should therefore be changed to allow the court
to order outpatient treatment as an alternative to commitment when a defendant is found incompetent to stand trial.68
If the court decides, after considering the recommendation from the examining psychiatrist, that commitment would be the best method of restoring a defendant's competency, then such commitment should be strictly
limited in time. It should not become an indefinite commitment. 169 Thus, a
maximum of one year should be established for such commitments; at the
end of this period, the court should have another hearing to determine
whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. If he is considered competent and is subsequently tried and convicted, the time that he spent in a
mental institution should be credited toward his sentence. If he is found
incompetent and there is little hope that he will regain his competency in
the near future, the following should occur: Where the state can make an
initial showing that the defendant is dangerous to himself or others because
of his mental condition, the court should have the discretion to detain defendant temporarily to allow the state to institute civil commitment proceedings immediately. If the defendant is civilly committed, then in most
cases, the charges against him should be dropped; however, if the crime
charged is particularly serious, then the state should be able to start the criminal proceedings again if the defendant is released from the mental institution within a specified number of years.
If the defendant is not civilly committable, then it may again be argued
that a defendant charged with a felony should not be allowed to go free.
But this argument ignores the fact that defendant has not been convicted of
166. 325 F2d 283 (2d Cir. 1963).
167. id. at 285.
168. Section 13A authorizes the Department of Health to "establish, foster, and develop
out-patient clinics." MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123, § 13A (1958).
169. Prior to the commitment, there should be a preliminary hearing to determine
whether there is "probable cause" to detain the defendant on the basis of the charge against
him; a complaint alone should not be considered sufficient for pre-trial commitments.
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any crime and is therefore presumed innocent. Furthermore, if society has
a legitimate interest in detaining such a defendant in a mental institution,
this interest should be protected under the civil commitment procedure. It
should not be asserted under the procedure of pre-trial criminal commitment, where the purpose of such a commitment (to restore a defendant to
competency) appears to be unobtainable. The criminal charge against the
defendant would not be dropped, and the state would have the prerogative
to attempt to bring him to trial when the state believes that the defendant
is competent.
In most cases, one year should be sufficient to determine whether a defendant will regain his competency to stand trial. If, at the hearing held at
the end of this one year period, the psychiatrist is reasonably certain that
the defendant will be able to stand trial within a short time, such as three
months, the court, in its discretion, can extend the commitment for this period. If at the end of this time, defendant still is unable to return to trial, the
criminal commitment should come to an end, and the court would have the
same alternatives discussed above. The purpose of such an arbitrary limit on
the pre-trial commitment is to avoid long and useless commitments such as
70
that which occurred in the well-known case of Ezra Pound.
During the defendant's pre-trial commitment, the hospital should report
to the court on the defendant's condition at regular intervals, e.g., every
three months. When the hospital believes that the defendant is competent
to stand trial, he should be immediately returned to the court. If the court
agrees with this conclusion, the criminal proceedings will be resumed. In
addition, the defendant's counsel should be allowed to request a hearing to
determine defendant's competency when the hospital files its required report to the court. The purpose of these recommendations is to provide ade170. United States v. Pound, Crim. No. 76028 (D.D.C., Nov. 26, 1945). For discussion of
this case, see Krash, The Durham Rule and judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 917 (1961). Pound was found unfit to
stand trial in 1945; the indictment against him was dismissed and he was finally released in
1958 when the hospital superintendent advised the court that "Pound suffered from a permanent and incurable paranoid state, that further treatment was useless, that there was no
likelihood that he would ever be sufficiently competent to stand trial, and that he would
not be dangerous if he were released." Commenting on the Pound case, Mr. Krash stated:
The justification for hospitalizing an incompetent person who has been indicted is that
he may respond to treatment sufficiently to stand trial; however, if recovery is improbable, continued detention is not warranted. Indeed, it can be persuasively argued that
due process requires that a defendant should be released even though he may be dangerous if it appears that he will never recover sufficiently to stand trial.... [I]f a trial can
never occur there is no justification for continued detention. Indefinite confinement of a
person who has never been tried or found guilty of any offense cannot be supported by a
procedural device of such limited scope....
The issue left open by the Pound proceeding is how long a defendant may be detained
before he must be released on the grounds that he will in all likelihood never be competent to stand trial.
Id. at 917.
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quate and continued supervision of the defendant's commitment by the committing court. As the court said in Johnson v. Settle, 171 a "[c]ourt owes a duty
to its ward to from time to time inquire as to the mental condition of its ward
and to legally determine whether or not the defendant is, in fact, competent
to stand trial or to be continued as a ward." Such supervision is nonexistent
at the present time in Massachusetts. While it is recognized that these recommendations will be an added burden for overworked courts and mental
hospitals, it is hoped that the number of these commitments will be greatly
reduced because of previous suggestions.
It has been pointed out that the defendant who is considered incompetent
to stand trial may have certain valid grounds for attacking the criminal
charge against him on the merits. Professor Foote summarized three different types of situations in which this might occur:
The first is the instance... where the defendant can show that the
prosecution is barred as a matter of law; another example would be
an indictment which on its face discloses that the statute of limitations has run. Second are cases where the defendant alleges that he
can show an intrinsic defect in the prosecution's factual case which
will prevent conviction, for example, that essential evidence was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure or that the prosecution's
evidence shows entrapment as a matter of law. Third, counsel for
an incompetent defendant may wish to assert an affirmative defense
which can be established without participation of the defendant.
In a robbery prosecution based on identification evidence, for example, counsel may be able to establish from employment records
and the testimony of third parties that the defendant was at work
in another city at the time of the crime. In all of these situations
present law appears to say to the defendant: "Wait. You can't raise
this until and if you have recovered. In the meantime we'll detain
you with the criminally insane, where you will have to live under
from which we will not allow you to exthe cloud of an accusation
172
culpate yourself."'
Professor Foote then recommended that if the court believes that the defendant is incompetent, it should defer a ruling to this effect if "counsel
moves to dismiss the indictment, or for exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, or raises any other matter which can be determined at a pre-trial
hearing....,173 In United States v. Marino, 174 the court allowed such a procedure when it ruled on the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment
for failing to state an offense against the United States before deciding
171. 184 F. Supp. 103, 106 (W.D. Mo. 1960).
172. Foote, A Comment on Pre.Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA.
L. Rm,. 832, 841 (1960).
173. Id. at 845.
174. 148 F. Supp. 75, 76 (N.D. IMI.1957).
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whether the defendant should be committed as incompetent. When this motion was granted, the court held that it had no power to proceed further under the incompetency statute. A different result was reached in United States
v. Barnes.1 5 There, the court dismissed the indictment against three defendants because of denial of their right to a speedy trial, but refused to dismiss
the indictment against the fourth codefendant, who was considered incompetent to stand trial. This defendant was committed, presumably until such
time as he would be sufficiently recovered to participate in the dismissal of
the indictment against him.170 The result in this case as to the incompetent
fourth defendant is unfair and inconsistent. Since the indictment was clearly
invalid, there was in reality no criminal charge against this defendant. As
Professor Foote observed, the result in Barnes can be defended only if "we
are prepared to incarcerate persons as criminally insane, not as an incident
to a valid pending charge of crime but simply in accordance with psychiatric
estimates of future dangerousness."' 77 In Massachusetts, such a procedure as
that recommended by Professor Foote would be possible; and one judge
stated that he would consider any pre-trial motions before ordering an indefinite commitment. Such motions should be allowed, and where the result
of the pre-trial hearing is a dismissal of the charges against the defendant,
there is no longer any justification for criminally committing him.
Professor Foote's second suggestion is more troublesome. He states that
where "counsel alleges that there is a good faith defense on the merits and
chooses to go to trial on the merits notwithstanding defendant's incompetency," the court shall "proceed to a trial on the merits." If there is a finding
of not guilty, "that will be the end of the matter"; if there is a guilty verdict,
"the court should then rule that the defendant is incompetent, set the verdict aside and commit the defendant ...until he is sufficiently recovered to
be retried or until other appropriate disposition can be made of the case."1 7 8
The problem with this proposal is that it tends to impose a great burden on
the court and the district attorney. On the other hand, both psychiatrists
interviewed by this writer stated that the primary difficulty in treating defendants committed prior to trial is that many of them believe that they have
been denied the opportunity to clear themselves of the charges against them.
Thus, a compromise between Professor Foote's proposal and the present procedure of not allowing such trials where the defendant is incompetent would
be to grant the court discretion as to whether such a trial should occur. The
175. 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
176. Foote, supra note 172, at 832.
177. Id. at 846.
178. Id. at 845-46. In Regina v. Roberts, [1953] 2 All E.R. 340, the court postponed a determination of the preliminary issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial "until the
general issue should be laid before the jury." However, Regina v. Beynon, [1957] 2 All
E.R. 513, refused to follow Roberts and required a prior determination of the defendant's
competency.
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defendant's counsel would have the burden of persuading the court that
such a trial would be likely to result in a verdict of not guilty. The previous
suggestions limiting the number and length of these pre-trial commitments
reduce the injustice to the possible innocent defendant who is denied this
opportunity to clear himself.
IV. Conclusion
It is hoped that these recommendations will eliminate some abuses which
exist in the current system of pre-trial commitment in Massachusetts. These
abuses are not a result of any judicial or psychiatric tyranny. Rather, they
are primarily a result of a vague statute and a lack of any judicial decisions
construing it. The conclusions of two psychiatrists who studied the Michigan
system of pre-trial commitment serve as an excellent description of the current state of affairs in Massachusetts:
We have described the breakdown of a vital social system necessitating collaboration between two highly respected professions.
The confused statute regarding incompetency to stand trial and
its distorted application by both physician and lawyer tends to subvert the social and legal principle inherent in the concept of competency and in so doing to sacrifice the professional identity of both
lawyer and physician as well as their appropriate functions as assigned by society and which their client has the right to expect.
In this process, the legal position becomes untenable. The court
cannot use the psychiatrist effectively because it cannot understand
him and because it does not demand that which could be understood. Therefore, in lieu of using his competence, it must accept his
pronouncements and tacitly his usurpation of its role. The valued
and traditional legal insistence on the right to determine fact is
passively given over to the acceptance of opinion as fact. The result
is that from start to finish the physician occupies a foremost yet
179
counterfeit role in incompetency proceedings.
It is likely that the recommendations of this article, intended as they are
to prevent the indiscriminate pre-trial commitment of defendants alleged to
be mentally ill, may force the state to use the civil commitment process for
the purpose of detaining many individuals in the custody of a mental institution. While an examination of the propriety of civil commitment is beyond the scope of this article, it is obvious that there are many problems inherent in such a process, even when the proceedings strictly follow the statutory standard for civil commitment. There are those who would argue that
there is no justification for society's detaining any individual in a mental
institution against his will on the ground that he is considered mentally ill
and "dangerous to himself or others."
179. Hess & Thomas, supra note 160, at 718.
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Regardless of the propriety of civil commitment, it is clearly unjustifiable
to use a criminal charge as a pretext for committing a defendant who is considered mentally ill, when there is no relationship between the defendant's
mental illness and his capacity to face the charges against him. As long as
such commitments are permitted, the type of cases cited in the introduction
of this article can occur at any time. Such cases taint the administration of
criminal justice in Massachusetts and many other jurisdictions. The procedure which permits their occurrence must therefore be changed.
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